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2. Introduction
2.1. Static, dynamic and behavioural microsimulation
models for the analysis of public policies
Microsimulation models are a useful tool for the ex-ante evaluation of specific
tax-benefit reforms. They are called micro-simulation models since, diﬀerently
from typical macroeconomic models, they preserve individual heterogeneity in the
simulation exercise.
The literature has proposed several types of microsimulation models. The most
common ones are known as static models. Their aim is to simulate in a very precise
way the national (and local) system of taxes and benefits using large microdata
surveys that are representative of the whole population. In particular, they recover
gross earnings (if not observed) and then simulate taxes amounts and benefit
entitlements for each unit in the sample in order to get the observed individual net
disposable incomes. These kind of simulators are useful for the evaluation of the
distributive impact of specific tax-benefit reforms. Indeed, once the tax-benefit
system changes, the vector of net disposable income that is recovered by means of
the simulation model will be diﬀerent from the original one (which is computed
according to the baseline tax-benefit system). Hence, the analyst can compute
the income distribution before and after the change and identify winner and losers
from the proposed reform.
These models are defined as “static” because they do not account for two im-
portant dimensions: individual dynamics (what happens in period t+1?) and
behaviour (what is the individual reaction to a specific change in the economic
environment?). According to these two dimensions, the literature has proposed
dynamic microsimulation models and behavioural microsimulation models. Impor-
tantly, traditional dynamic microsimulation models do not account for behaviour
in a structural way as a behavioural microsimulation model does. Indeed, they
mainly work with transition probabilities (recovered from diﬀerent source of data)
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and Markov processes so that a given event is not the result of an explicit optimal
decision based on a structural microeconomic model.
As an example, assume a specific individual is observed working full time in
period t. In period t+1, this individual will change his working time (say from full
time to part-time) if, and only if, his/her specific transition probability - which is
computed from a multivariate econometric model so that it depends on a set of
observed individual characteristics - is higher then a random number drawn from
a (typically uniform) probability distribution. The dynamic evolves in this way for
many important events of the individual life, as fertility, marriage, child-bearing,
education, health, disability, type of work, job eﬀort, retirement, mortality, etc.
Hence, the analyst can forecast the distribution of a specific characteristic - say
net disposable income - over a long time span so that the eﬀect of a specific
reform today (as a pension reform) can be evaluated in the long run. The aim
of behavioural microsimulation models, on the other hand, is to use the standard
economic theory to predict specific changes in individual choices once a given
element of the economic environment has changed.
As an example, assume the government introduces a new tax. Then, it is plausi-
ble that some people will change their behaviour in the labour market, say reducing
the number of hours they work from a full time to a part time contract. Accord-
ing to this example, a behavioural microsimulation model uses a microeconomic
model (typically with optimising behaviour subject to given budget constraints)
to predict the overall change in the number of hours of work related to the change
in the tax system. Of course, this behavioural change will take time to take place
but the behavioural model do not consider the dynamic of this adjustment, it just
gives the new final optimal choice. As these two examples have shown, behavioural
and dynamic microsimulation models are intrinsically diﬀerent and cannot be com-
pared. However, thanks to the progress in computer technology, a new generation
of models known as structural dynamic microsimulation models will be soon op-
erative and will allow exploring the dynamics of behavioural reactions to specific
changes in the economic environment over the life cycle1.
The literature has already proposed a dynamic simulation model for the Italian
case2. As for Italian behavioural microsimulation models, the work of Aaberge
et al. (1998) and Aaberge et al. (2000) is particularly important, since these authors
1For a recent example of such models see van de Ven and Weale (2009).
2See Mazzaferro and Morciano (2008) for details.
10
2.1. Static, dynamic and behavioural microsimulation models for the analysis of public policies
have been some of the first in the international literature to propose a specific
framework for the analysis of simulated behavioural responses to tax reforms using
microsimulation models. However, the literature has proposed another approach
for behavioural microsimulation models, which is based on the work of Van Soest
(1995) and Keane and Moﬃtt (1998). As we will see, the two approaches are
similar and their main diﬀerence rests on the way the individual choice set is
constructed.
The main aim of this dissertation is to propose a behavioural microsimulation
model that explores and expands the Van Soest’s approach for the Italian case. In-
deed, we propose a behavioural model that is able to account for many dimensions
that are expected to influence the labour supply decision of many individuals. In
particular, we allow for child-care expenditures, observed and unobserved individ-
ual preference heterogeneity for consumption and leisure, fixed costs of working
and joint labour supply for married couples. The model is applied to the evaluation
of the distributive and eﬃciency eﬀects of the last three main reforms of the Italian
personal income tax and important conclusions about the equity-eﬃciency trade
oﬀ are discussed and analysed. Furthermore, we explore in deep detail the practical
implications of unobserved preference heterogeneity for consumption and leisure
in discrete models of labour supply, which is of interest to any kind of behavioural
microsimulation model, no matter the approach used. In particular, we claim that
the way researchers account for unobserved tastes in the econometric specification
has an important impact on the subsequent estimates, and this - in return - implies
that the eﬃciency and welfare analysis may change significantly depending how
unobserved heterogeneity is introduced in the specification. Of course, this has
important implications for the empirical literature, the aim of which is to evaluate
specific tax-benefit reforms in order to derive policy recommendations.
In general, we believe that behavioural models are a very powerful tool for the
evaluation of public policies and this thesis contributes to this literature exploring
specific issues and proposing an innovative model for the Italian case. Obviously,
much more can be done and several lines for future research are proposed in several
occasions throughout the various chapters.
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2.2. Behavioural microsimulation models and structure of
this thesis
This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of behavioural microsimulation models for
the evaluation of the eﬀects of specific tax-benefit reforms on the labour supply
decisions of the Italian population. As we have anticipated in the previous section,
a behavioural microsimulation model contains a structural microeconomic model
that explains the link between the two phenomena under analysis, that is the tax-
benefit roles and the labour supply decision, in our specific case. Of course, the
results of any simulation depend on the specific model used in the analysis and its
assumptions. Hence, great care will be devoted to the specification of our model
and to the analysis of its implicit and explicit assumptions.
Chapter 3 contains a detailed explanation of the model we propose, with a special
focus on the econometric framework used for both the estimation and identification
of the structural parameters. In particular, we will explore the performance of a
labour supply estimation method based on a discrete choice set. The idea behind
this approach is to work directly with preferences for leisure and consumption,
instead of typical labour supply functions.
As it will be clarified, the main advantage of the discrete approach is the pos-
sibility to deal easily with non-convex budget sets, household labour supply and
non-participation choices. Of course, these advantages let the discrete approach
relatively suitable for policy evaluation purposes. We will use the papers from
Blundell, Dancan, McCrae and Meghir (1999) and Brewer, Duncan, Shepard and
Suarez (2006) as main references for the structural microeconometric model and
several innovative elements will be taken into account with respect to previous
Italian studies. In particular, we present a model that allows for errors in the pre-
dicted wages for non-workers, unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, unobserved
monetary fixed costs of working and child-care demand.
The chapter concludes presenting and disussing the labour supply elasticities
for married women and men that we computed throughout our model. Finally, an
overview of the Stata® routine for the Simulated Maximum Likelihood estimation
is presented in the appendix.
Chapter 4 contains an application of our behavioural model to the evaluation of
the distributive and eﬃciency eﬀects of the three most recent reforms of the Italian
personal income tax. In order to show the functioning of our model, the analysis
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of these reforms will be carried out in three diﬀerent stages. In the first one we
will study the “pure” distributive eﬀects of the reforms using the static part of our
microsimulation model. In the second stage we will focus on the labour supply
eﬀects by means of the structural microeconometric model of household labour
supply outlined in the previous chapter; finally, we will analyse the distributive
eﬀects of the reforms accounting for labour supply reactions.
Our findings confirm that the extension of the no-tax area had positive eﬀects in
terms of both redistribution and work incentives, and in the same time greater ben-
efits for households with children improved income distribution but with negative
eﬀects on the labour supply of married women.
Finally, chapter 5 focuses on the role of unobserved preference heterogeneity
in structural discrete choice models of labour supply. Within this framework,
unobserved heterogeneity has been estimated either parametrically or nonpara-
metrically through random coeﬃcient models. However, several examples in the
literature have shown that the estimation of such models by means of standard,
gradient-based methods is often diﬃcult, in particular if the number of random
parameters is high. For this reason, the role of unobserved tastes variability in
empirical studies is constrained, since only a small set of coeﬃcients is allowed to
be random. However, this simplification may aﬀect the estimated labour supply
elasticities and the subsequent policy prescriptions.
Following this intuition, in this chapter we propose a new estimation method
based on an EM algorithm that allows to fully consider the eﬀect of unobserved
heterogeneity nonparametrically. Results show that labour supply elasticities and
policy prescriptions do change significantly only when the full set of coeﬃcients is
assumed to be random.
Moreover, we will analyse the behavioural eﬀects of the introduction of a working-
tax credit scheme in the Italian tax-benefit system and show that the magnitude
of labour supply reactions and the post-reform income distribution can diﬀer sig-
nificantly depending on the specification of unobserved heterogeneity.
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3. A behavioural microsimulation model for Italian married couples
3.1. Introduction
Discrete vs continuous structural labour supply models
Traditionally, structural labour supply models assume a choice set defined on any
positive real number of worked hours. This is what Van Soest (1995) defines as the
continuous approach. In this continuous framework, the agent chooses the best
combination of consumption and leisure so as to maximise her utility function
given a time and a budget constraint. Importantly, there are no constraints on
the amount of leisure the agent can choose from: hours of leisure can be any real
number up to the maximum amount available.
The literature has developed two diﬀerent approaches for continuous labour
supply. Often, a labour supply function is estimated relating hours worked with
net-wage rates, non-labour incomes and individual characteristics. Then, indirect
utility and expenditure functions are recovered by integration methods. Neverthe-
less, appropriate constraints on the parameters have to be imposed a priory so as
to ensure duality conditions to hold. Moreover, in order to capture a relative wide
range of labour supply behaviour, a reasonably flexible labour supply function is
needed, with the subsequent diﬃculties during the integration procedure.
Another possibility in continuous microsimulation is to work directly with pref-
erences with supply function derived from either a direct or an indirect utility
function. Here the main problem is the tax schedule that enter the budget con-
straint, which can create several problems in the estimation stage.
In general, continuous microsimulation suﬀers of several problems no matter the
approach followed. A first starting issue, for example, is how to recover the budget
constraint for each possible level of labour supply. In continuous models, one or
five minutes intervals of labour supply are needed for each individual, which means
that with a standard total amount of time of 80 hours per week and thousands of
individuals in the sample, this would be extremely time consuming1.
Another complicated issue is the presence of a real tax-benefit system, which
may give rise to highly non-linear and non-convex budget sets for most of the pop-
ulation of interest. This implies that feasible estimations require the linearisation
of the budget constraint around the observed level of hours or the construction of
search algorithms that compare the maximum utility on each linear segment of a
1Duncan and Stark (2000) have developed an algorithm in GAUSS that is able to recover budget sets
more eﬃciently and accurately.
18
3.1. Introduction
piecewise-linear budget constraint2.
Moreover, considerable problems arises because of the simultaneity between net-
wages and hours of work with the subsequent necessity to find appropriate instru-
ments so as to ensure identification. Finally, other diﬃculties arise when the model
try to allow for important extensions like unobserved preference heterogeneity, joint
labour supply and non-participation.
As Creedy and Duncan (2002) point out, these criticisms make the continuous
approach seldom used nowadays. Indeed, the recent literature has shown that a
discrete approach to labour supply modelling solves most of the problems that are
typically found in continuous models and allows for some important extensions.
The discrete model of labour supply is still based on the assumption of utility
maximising agents as in the continuous approach but now the agent is constrained
to choose from just few hour points instead of any possible hour in the real line.
The utility is defined over income and leisure (hours of work) and any assumption
is made a priori on the marginal (dis)utility of leisure (work) and income. If
a stochastic component is added to the utility function, then the probability of a
particular choice of hours of work can be derived and the likelihood function can be
computed. In other words, what is estimated in the discrete approach are not the
parameters of a classical Marshallian labour supply function but the parameters
that define the shape of the utility function.
Given that the tax-benefit system enters the utility only indirectly through the
consumption term, complicated tax schedules and non-convex budget sets do not
represent a problem anymore. Moreover, any problems arise from the choice of the
utility function given that the form of the probabilities depends on the assumptions
on the utility stochastic component. Finally, the budget constraints have to be
computed for just the few hour points the agent is constrained to choose from, and
not for any possible level. Furthermore, the discrete approach allows for important
extensions that are diﬃcult to consider in the continuous model. Indeed, as it
will be clarified later, wage unobserved components for non-workers, child-care
demands, fixed costs of working, heterogeneity in preferences, non-participation
and joint labour supply can be incorporated in the model in a very convenient
way.
2A first generation of model linearized the budget constraint by computing the average net wage rate
corresponding to the observed hours. Other subsequent models have elaborated algorithms that
examine the full budget constraint when searching for the optimal level of labour supply, allowing
for nonlinearities and nonconvexities. See Creedy and Duncan (2002) for references.
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The main drawbacks of the discrete approach are the rounding errors produced
when the choice set is discretised and the incomplete use of available information3.
As Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) point out in their literature review of labour
supply modelling, the discrete approach has to be preferred to other models be-
cause of its flexibility, in particular when the aim is the ex-ante evaluation of a
specific policy reform. Modelling labour supply responses using a discrete approach
has become increasingly popular in recent years, in particular when the aim of the
analysis is the evaluation of a specific tax reform.
Earlier international works that explore this method are those from Van Soest
(1995), Keane and Moﬃtt (1998) and Blundell et al. (2000). The econometric
model used in these papers has now become standard in the literature and a similar
version is also used in this work. Recent examples include: Brewer et al. (2006)
who extend the paper of Blundell et al. (2000) to study the impact of the WFTC
reforms in the UK, Breunig et al. 2008 who estimate the wage equation and the
structural labour supply model simultaneously allowing for correlation between
the random terms, Haan (2006), who studies the German case comparing the
performance of a random coeﬃcients specification with respect to the performance
of a more simple model without unobserved heterogeneity, Labeaga et al. (2008)
who study the impact of the Spanish tax reform on eﬃciency and social welfare.
A very active centre that is specialised on microsimulation and labour supply in a
discrete choice framework is at the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economics. I
remand to Creedy and Kalb (2005) for a review of some of their papers.
For the Italian’s case Aaberge et al. (2000) developed a model of labour supply
allowing for diﬀerent job types for each household; in their paper, job alternatives
are defined over a continuum of wage rates, hours of work and other job character-
istics. The analyst does not observe the opportunity set of each household so that
the probability of choosing a particular job has to be weighted with the probability
of receiving that particular job oﬀer. Recently, Mancini (2007), developed a model
that is closely related to the one discussed here in order to study the labour supply
response to minimum income policies. Del Boca et al. (2005) study the impact of
child-care rationing on female labour supply using a bivariate probit model for the
joint decision of child-care and labour supply.
However, diﬀerently from the other models that have been developed for the
3The wider the hours categories used to discretise the choice set the bigger the rounding error, see
Van Soest (1995) for this point.
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Italian case, the model presented in this paper accounts for many innovative fea-
tures simultaneously. Indeed, we estimate jointly the labour supply behaviour of
married women and men allowing for errors in predicted wages, work-related mon-
etary costs, child-care costs and unobserved random preferences for consumption
and leisure.
Work-related monetary costs are important since they eliminate the reservation
wage condition in estimation and, depending on how these costs are specified, they
may help to relax the assumption of fixed wage rates4.
Furthermore, we also account for endogenous child-care expenditures and un-
observed heterogeneity in preferences. Both these features are relevant. From a
practical point of view, child-care expenditures have a role similar to those of other
fixed costs of working since they may help to eliminate the reservation wage condi-
tion for household with children during the estimation. Unobserved heterogeneity
is also important so as to get unbiased estimates given the assumption made on
the distribution of the utility function5.
Finally, one more important diﬀerence from previous studies regards the way
we take into account the endogeneity related to estimated wages for non-workers.
Indeed, we integrate out wages by drawing randomly from their estimated distri-
bution and weighting the likelihood when wages are not observed in the data.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the general framework
for the structural microeconometric model. Section 3 presents the extensions to the
basic model. Section 4 explains the data used for the empirical analysis. Section
5 describes the estimation procedure. Section 6 contains results from first stage
regressions and section 7 discusses the estimates of the structural model. The
appendix contains an overview of the Stata® algorithm coded for the estimation
of the structural model.
4See Brewer et al. (2006) for this point.
5As it will be clarified later, the direct utility function is assumed to follow a type 1 extreme value
distribution, which underlines the typical IIA (independence from irrelevant alternatives) property.
The way unobserved heterogeneity is introduced can relax the extent of this assumption and this is
important because such property could be particularly binding in our labour supply framework.
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3.2. The structural model
In this section we develop the econometric framework for the empirical analysis.
We focus only on married/de facto couples and do not consider singles6. In what
follows we adopt a unitary framework to model the intra-household decision pro-
cess, which means that the couple as a whole has to be considered as the decision
maker. However, it is worth noting that a recent literature has shown that the
unitary assumption is often rejected empirically. Nevertheless, a collective model
of labour supply is far away to be a practicable model to be used for a detailed pol-
icy analysis. Moreover, a collective model has to be simplified in other directions
and is based on discountable assumptions for the identification of the bargaining
parameter7.
For these reasons we follow the main literature and assume a unitary model of
labour supply. This means that the two members of the couple simultaneously
choose a particular combination of hours of work for both of them in order to
maximise a joint utility function defined over the household net income and the
hours of work of both the spouses.
As common in the literature, we assume that the gross wage rates are fixed
and do not depend on the hours of work8. This implies that the hours of work
uniquely define the household’s gross income alternatives while the tax-benefit
system uniquely defines the net household income alternatives. The decision is
then taken given the tax-benefit system and the gross wage rates.
Under the assumption that the couple is utility maximising and that the utility
is not deterministic, it is possible to recover the probability of a particular choice,
which is the base for the computation of the likelihood function.
To be formal, let Hj = [hfj ;hmj] be a vector of worked hours for alternative
j , hf for married women and hm for married men. Let yij be the net household
income and Xi be a vector of individual and household characteristics. Then the
utility of household i when H =Hj is:
Uij = U(yij, Hj, Xi) + ξij (3.1)
6The labour supply model for single is based on the same assumptions and can be easily constructed
and estimated.
7See Chiappori (1992) and Blundell et al. (2008) for a collective model of labour supply. Chiappori and
Ekeland (2006) discuss on the identification assumptions in a collective framework.
8Some studies have found a part time pay penalty, see Manning and Petrongolo (2008). However there
are several ways that relax this assumption that will be discussed in the next sections.
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Where ξij is a choice-specific stochastic component which is assumed to be inde-
pendent across the alternatives and to follow a type-one extreme value distribution.
This component capture any couple-specific misunderstanding in the perception
of the utility derived from a particular choice of hours and it can be seen as an
optimisation error. The net-household income of household i when alternative j
is chosen is defined as follows:
yij = w¯ifhfj + w¯imhmj + nlyi + TB(w¯if ; w¯im; Hj; nlyi; Xi) (3.2)
Where w¯if and w¯im are the (fixed) hourly gross wages from employment for women
and men respectively; nlyi is the household non-labour income and the function
TB(w¯if ; w¯im; Hj; nlyi; Xi) represents the tax-benefit system, which depends on
the gross wage rates, hours of work, household non-labour income and individual
characteristics. It is worth noting that this function can be highly non-linear
for most of the population of interest. Following Keane and Moﬃtt (1998) and
Blundell et al. (2000), the observed part of the utility defined above is parametrised
as a second order polynomial with interaction between the wife and the husband
terms:
U(yij;Hj;Xi) = α1y2ij + α2hf
2
j + α3hm
2
j+
+α4hfjhmj + α5yijhfj + α6yijhmj+
+β1yij + β2hfj + β3hmj
(3.3)
To introduce individual characteristics in the utility, the coeﬃcients of the linear
terms are defined as follows:
βj =
Kj￿
i=1
βijxij + νj j￿{1, 2, 3} (3.4)
with the νj terms being the unobserved household preferences for both income and
work, which are assumed to be independents and normally distributed.
The presence of these random terms is important for two reasons. On the one
hand, they relax the IIA assumption which is implicit whenever the latent factor
(here the utility gained from each alternative) follows a standard extreme value
distribution9. On the other hand, they allow for heterogeneity in preferences in
9IIA is the acronym of Independence form Irrelevant Alternatives. This property is particularly restric-
tive in the labour supply framework. Consider a choice set initially defined by just two alternatives:
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the model.
Under the assumption that the couple maximises her utility over a discrete
set of alternatives and that the error term in the utility function follows a type-
one extreme value distribution independent across alternatives, the probability of
choosing a particular vector Hj = [hfj ;hmj] is given by10:
Pr(H =Hj|Xi) = Pr[Uij > Uis,∀s ￿= j]
=
exp(U(yij , Hj, Xi))￿K
k=1 exp(U(yik, Hk, Xi))
(3.5)
Given the presence of unobserved components, it is necessary to integrate over their
distributions to evaluate the likelihood function. For observation i the likelihood
is:
Li =
ˆ
ν
K￿
j=1
￿
exp(U(yij,Hj,Xi))￿K
k=1 exp(U(yik,Hk,Xi))
￿dij
φ(ν)d(ν) (3.6)
Where dij is a dummy variable equal to one for the observed choice and zero
otherwise. Up to this point, we have not considered the problem of not observed
wages for non-workers. The approach adopted here is to make an assumption on
the wage generating process and to estimate the wage rate before estimating of
the structural model of labour supply.
Of course, it would be more eﬃcient taking into account the incidental truncation
during the estimation of the structural model but the relative gain in eﬃciency is
oﬀset by an high increment in computational time11. We assume that wage for
agent i is generated by the following selection process:
log(wi) =X1iβ + ￿i (3.7)
wi is observed⇐⇒ U∗i = utility of work > 0
U∗i = Ziα+ εi (3.8)￿
￿i
εi
￿
∼ N
￿￿
0
0
￿
;
￿
σ2￿ ρ
ρ 1
￿￿
(3.9)
working full time and not working. The IIA assumption implies that introducing another alternative,
say a part time job, does not change the relative odds between the two initial alternatives.
10See McFadden (1973) for a proof.
11See Keane and Moﬃtt (1998).
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Where Zi = [X1i,X2i]￿ is a vector of individual characteristics. The assumptions
on the wage generation process allows to estimate consistently the gross wage rate
whenever it is not observed in the data. Then, the unobserved component of
wages is integrated out from the likelihood during the labour supply estimation by
drawing randomly from its distribution. This means that the likelihood changes
as follows:
Li =
ˆ
￿
ˆ
ν
K￿
j=1
￿
exp(U(yij,Hj,Xi))￿K
k=1 exp(U(yik,Hk,Xi))
￿dij
φ(ν)φ(￿)d(ν)d(￿) (3.10)
Where the integration over ￿ takes place only when the wage is not observed. As
anticipated in the introduction, the discrete approach allow considering important
extensions to this basic model as fixed costs of working and child-care demand,
which could be added in very convenient way to the basic model. This is the aim
of the next section.
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3.3. Extension to the basic model
The model outlined in the previous section is not able to replicate the data accu-
rately. The main reason is that it does not take into account the characteristics of
particular hour points that may help to eliminate the reservation wage condition12.
There are several ways to account for these problems. For example, Aaberge
et al. (2000) allow for diﬀerent job oﬀers for each individual with job alternatives
defined over diﬀerent combinations of wage rates and hours of work. This speci-
fication explicitly allow for diﬀerent characteristics of each level of labour supply
since it assume a distribution of job oﬀers that puts more weights on particular
hours categories. However, it increases the computational burden since the choice
set becomes actually infinite, which then requires sampling methods so as to let
the estimation feasible13.
Another common approach is to allow for diﬀerent characteristics of particular
hours points by using ad-hoc penalties in the utility function14. This method
may serve to account for diﬀerent hours characteristics but it is not clear whether
it could eliminate the reservation wage condition. Moreover, this procedure has
the additional problem that the estimated coeﬃcients of the penalty variables are
measured in term of utility and do not represent monetary values.
The approach we follow is the one used in Brewer et al. (2006). The idea is
that labour supply is often constrained implying a loss when the agent has to
choose an alternative that is not exactly the one she would choose without con-
straints. Hence, diﬀerent hour alternatives may imply diﬀerent costs. These costs
can be both psychological and physical but in both cases they can be quantified in
monetary terms. Intuitively, these costs are on average higher for the choice be-
tween non-participation (zero hours of work) and participation but there could be
also an additional cost for the choice between part-time alternatives and full-time
alternatives.
Following this idea, we consider the characteristics of diﬀerent discrete points
12Indeed, it has been found that the basic model systematically over-predict part-time alternatives and
non-participation. See Van Soest (1995) for a discussion.
13The authors approximate the infinite choice set with a sample of weighted alternatives, with the
weighting depending on the sampling scheme from the univariate densities of wages and hours. This
make their model somewhat close to the multinomial logit used in this paper. See Aaberge et al.
(2000) for details.
14This approach has been followed by several authors, see Mancini (2007), Haan (2006) and Van Soest
(1995)
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by estimating the monetary cost of working for three groups of discrete points.
In particular, we allow for diﬀerent work-related costs by distinguishing among
non-participation, part time and full time alternatives. These work-related costs
are modelled as fixed, unobserved costs directly subtracted from net income at
positive working hours with an additional cost whether the agent chooses to work
full time15.
Diﬀerently from other papers that use ad-hoc penalties, the approach we follow
allows the estimation of values that are indicative of the real monetary cost of
choosing a given amount of worked hours. More importantly, this method may
serve to relax the assumption that wage rates are fixed across alternatives, a point
that actually drives also the specification of Aaberge et al. (2000). Finally, several
studies have shown that netting out monetary costs of working from net income
may also have the positive eﬀect of leading to estimated preferences that are more
likely to be convex16.
Formally, fixed costs can be defined as follows17:
FC(hfj,Z) = Z1γ1·1{hfj > 0}+Z2γ2·1{hfj > 30} (3.11)
Where Z1 and Z2 are vectors of individuals characteristics, γ1 and γ2 are vectors
of parameters that are estimated jointly with the other structural parameters and
1{−} are binary indicators that take value one whenever the argument inside the
brackets is true.
To take into account child-care costs we adopt a diﬀerent strategy. As pointed
out in Del Boca et al. (2005), Italy has an objective lack of data on child-care
usage and child-care costs. In order to overcome this problem, we recover infor-
mation on child-care costs from another database. In particular, we computed the
hourly price of child-care for diﬀerent groups of households and for each group we
approximated the distribution of the hourly price of child-care by a 4 point mass
distribution whenever the household is observed buying formal child-care.
Given that households with working mother are more likely to buy formal child-
care, we take into account a possible selection bias by computing the proportion of
households that use formal child-care for both working and non-working mothers.
15Identification of these costs follows from the exclusion of the non-participation category.
16See Heim and Meyer (2004).
17As in Blundell et al. (2000) and Brewer et al. (2006), we assume positive costs of working only for
female.
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We do not consider any other possible source of selection bias, which implicitly
means that households that are not observed buying formal child-care would pay
exactly the same amount as households observed buying formal child-care. Finally,
we estimate the statistical relationship between hours of work and hours of child-
care for diﬀerent groups of households defined according to the number of children
and their age.
Whit this information on child-care costs and child-care usage it is possible
to approximate the weekly cost of child-care for diﬀerent alternatives of working
hours in the original database. This cost is then subtracted from net income at
any possible choice of hours and the price of child-care is then integrated out from
the likelihood in order to account for unobserved quality.
To be formal, define a child-care cost function as:
CC(hfj, pc,Xi) = E[hcc|Xi, hfj]·pc (3.12)
Where pc is a particular price for an hour of child-care and E[hcc|Xi, hfj] is the
expected hours of child-care for a particular household’s group given the choice
hfj. Like work-related costs, child-care costs enter the model as a once oﬀ cost
directly subtracted from net income at any possible choice of hours. Defining a
total cost function as:
TCi = CC(hfj, pc,X i) + FC(hfj,Zi) (3.13)
the utility function changes as follows:
Uij = U(yij − TCi, Hj, Xi) + ξij (3.14)
and the likelihood for observation i becomes:
Li =
5￿
s=1
P (psc|Xi)
ˆ
u
K￿
j=1
￿
exp(U(yij − TCij,Hj,Xi))￿K
k=1 exp(U(yik − TCik,Hk,Xi))
￿dij
φ(u)d(u)
(3.15)
Where u = (￿, ν1, ν2, ν3) collects all the random terms, P (psc|Xi) is the probability
that household i faces a price of child-care pc and dj is a dummy that picks up the
observed choice.
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The likelihood above is diﬃcult to estimate since it requires the computation of
a four dimensional integral. Following Train (2003), we apply simulation methods
to approximate these integrals. In particular, we use Halton sequences instead of
traditional random draws from the densities since they ensure a more complete
coverage of the integration support, which implies that a smaller number of draws
is needed to reach consistent estimates. The simulated log-likelihood is:
Li =
5￿
s=1
P (psc|Xi)
1
R
R￿
r=1
K￿
j=1
￿
exp(U(yij − TCsij,Hj,Xi,νr))￿K
k=1 exp(U(yik − TCsik,Hk,Xi,νr))
￿dij
(3.16)
Where R is the number of Halton draws used. The routine we coded to maximise
this likelihood is discussed in the appendix.
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3.4. Data
The main source of data is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
conducted by the Bank of Italy every two years. The survey has both a cross
section and a panel dimension. It collects very detailed information on earnings as
well as social and demographic characteristics. This survey has been widely used
for labour supply analysis and policy evaluation18.
In the present study we use the cross sectional survey for the year 2002. The
database is representative of the whole Italian population and contains about
21,000 observations and 8,000 households. Since the model presented in the previ-
ous section is not appropriate to describe the labour supply decisions of any kind of
household, we focus only on a selected sub-sample of the whole population. In par-
ticular, as standard in the literature on labour supply, we do not consider couples
with either spouses are aged over 60 years, self-employed, involved in a full time
education programs or serving the Army. Couples with self-employed spouses are
omitted because it is diﬃcult to estimate their budget constraint correctly. The
other excluded couples are omitted because they might have a behaviour in the
labour market that is not characterised by just the traditional trade-oﬀ between
leisure and income.
Very detailed information about net income and wealth is provided in the survey.
To recover gross incomes we use a modified version of the arithmetic tax-benefit
microsimulation model called MAPP02 . This model has been developed at the
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia19 and is able to generate gross incomes,
benefit entitlements and tax amounts for each household in the data. MAPP02 has
been adapted to make it suitable for the present study. In particular, the Stata®
modules of MAPP02 have been modified to generate diﬀerent vectors of taxes
(positives and negatives) and net individual incomes for any possible combination
of worked hours among which the couple can choose from.
As explained in the previous section, we also use another database to recover
information about child-care costs and child-care usage. In this case, the source
of data is the survey “MULTISCOPO” 1998 on Households and Childhood Con-
ditions, which is conducted by the Italian national institute of statistics (ISTAT).
This survey is relatively old but it is the only one that contains detailed information
18See Del Boca et al. (2005), Aaberge et al. (2000), Mancini (2007), Brandolini (1999), Baldini et al.
(2002), Baldini and Pacifico (2008).
19See Baldini (2004).
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on child-care expenditure, hours of child-care and hours of work. Unfortunately,
the information on child-care expenditures is registered only for children with less
than 7 years so that we are able to compute child-care costs only for those couples
who have young children.
Nevertheless, this is not a great limitation since the government provides uni-
versal education for older children. The two databases are relatively similar and
both are representative of the same population.
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3.5. Estimation procedure
In this section we comment on the procedure used for the estimation of the struc-
tural labour supply model. The estimation process is divided in steps, following
the natural development of the model outlined in the previous sections.
The first step is the definition of the relevant sub-sample and the re-arrangement
of the information contained in the two databases so as to gather all the information
needed for the analysis. This implies the alignment of the two sources of data so
that the information can be compared.
The next step is to use the tax-benefit simulator so as to recover gross wages for
those observations observed working. The information on the number of worked
months and the average hours of work per week is used to recover the gross hourly
wages. Gross hourly wages for unemployed workers are estimated making use of
the wage generating process outlined above, which leads to a classical Heckman
selection model. This is done separately for both the spouses in the couple. Using
post-estimate results from the wage equations it is possible to predict hourly gross
wages for non-workers. Following the wage model outlined above, predicted wages
for non-workers could be computed as:
E[ln(wi)|ln(wi) is not observed;Xi] =X iβˆ − σˆ￿ρˆλ(Ziαˆ) (3.17)
Where λ(Ziα) = φ(Ziα)Φ(Ziα) is the mills ratio computed according to equation [7]-[9].
However, using just the predicted wages for non-workers would lead to inconsistent
estimates as long as wages are endogenous and predicted with errors.
Here, we implement the following technique to avoid these problems. Given the
assumption on the wage generating process outlined in the previous section it is
possible to recover the distribution of the unobserved wage component20:
￿i|ln(wi) not observed ∼ N(−σˆ￿ρˆλ(Ziαˆ) ; −σˆ2￿ [1− ρˆ2ψ(Ziαˆ)]) (3.18)
Where ψ(Ziαˆ) = λ(Ziαˆ)(λ(Ziαˆ) + Ziαˆ). We use 50 random numbers for each
observation from the latter distribution. Then we add this random part to the
predicted mean before taking the exponential. Defining r as the rth draw, the
predicted log-hourly gross wage for non-worker i is:
20See Greene (2007) for a proof.
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ln(wi) =Xiβˆ + ￿ri (3.19)
Finally, notice that:
exp(E[ln(x)]) ￿= E[exp(ln(x))] = E[x] (3.20)
But if ln(x) ∼ N(µ,σ2), then:
E[x] = eµe
1
2σ
2 (3.21)
Which in our case means:
E[ln(wi)|ln(wi) is not observed;Xi] = exp(X iβˆ+￿ri )exp(
σˆ￿
2
[1−ρˆψ(Ziαˆ)]) (3.22)
This represents the expected wage for non-worker i given the rth draw. Once
hourly gross wages are obtained for all the observations in the relevant sample, the
tax-benefit simulator is used to get the net labour incomes for each possible choice
of discrete worked hours. The discrete points are defined according to the observed
distribution of worked hours. The graphs below show such a distributions for both
men and women in couples21.
21The graphs refer to the selected sample. The graph for men includes non participation. The graph for
women includes only the intensive margin (the participation rate for the selected sample of women
is 49.7%).
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According to these distributions, women in a couple are restricted to choose from
the following discrete set: x={0, 10, 20, 30, 40}. These points correspond to the
following intervals: 0-5, 6-15, 16-25, 26-36, >36. For married men we select the
following discrete set: y={0, 40, 50}, which corresponds to the intervals: 0-10,
11-42 and >42 . Since the labour supply for married female and men is estimated
jointly, each couple has a choice set defined by the cartesian product y·x which
leads to 15 possible combinations of discrete points.
The modified version of MAPP02 computes total benefit entitlements and total
tax amounts for each possible combination of discrete points given gross hourly
wages. The algorithm takes time since for k possible choices of hours and 50
draws each non-worker has k50 diﬀerent net labour incomes. This means that the
computational time increases exponentially when the choice set is expanded.
The net income for a particular alternative is computed by subtracting taxes
and adding benefits plus non-taxable incomes to the gross labour income. This
amount is then added up over the two spouses so as to get the total net household
income.
Before proceeding with the estimation of the structural model, information on
child-care costs and usage has to be collected from the ISTAT database. In this lat-
ter database we first drop the households without children younger than 7 years be-
cause for these households any information on child-care expenditures is recorded.
Obviously, this represents a restriction due to data constraints but it must be
pointed out that the school for kids is the most expensive one in Italy. Indeed,
children that have turned six have access to the public school, which is basically
free of charge.
Using only this sub-sample, we define 8 groups for child-care expenditure ac-
cording to the presence of children aged less than 3, geographic area (northern,
southern) and mother’s education (low or high). For each group we compute the
distribution of hourly expenditure in formal child-care for those households ob-
served demanding formal child-care. Then we approximate this distribution using
4 mass points. Next, we compute sub-groups controlling for the mother’s working
status, which implies that 16 groups are now defined. For each of them we com-
pute the percentage of households that have zero spending in child-care so that
for each mother in each sub-group the probability of zero and positive spending is
known.
This set of probabilities is used to integrate-out child-care quality from the like-
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lihood function. In practise, this means that for a mother in a particular group
the likelihood is evaluated 5 times (when price=0, price=quartile1, p=quartile2,
etc). Then, the expected contribution to the likelihood is computed using these
probabilities as weights. The expected probability of choosing alternative j for
observation i is then given by:
Pr(pc = 0)Pr(Hj|X i,u, pc = 0) +
4￿
s=1
[(1−Pr(pc = 0))·0.25]Pr(Hj|X i,u, psc > 0)
(3.23)
Where Pr(Hj|X i,u, psc) is the probability of choosing alternative j as defined
above.
The next step is to compute the statistical relationship between hours of work
and hours of child-care. This is done by running simple OLS regressions for 6
groups defined by the number of children and their age, without controlling for
any sample selection bias. Following Blundell et al. (2000) we assume a linear
relationship between hours of work and hours of child-care so that for each group
the following child-care cost function is estimated:
hcc = β0 + β1hfj (3.24)
Whit this information it is possible to estimate the structural model. The estima-
tion algorithm is implemented in Stata®. An overview of the Stata® routine used
for this chapter is presented in the appendix.
35
3. A behavioural microsimulation model for Italian married couples
3.6. Results from first-stage regressions
This section contains the set of estimates for the wage equations and child-care
costs and usage. Table 1 presents the estimates of the wage equations for both
female and male in couples. To identify the coeﬃcients in the wage equations a
set of instruments is used. This set includes dummies for the youngest child by
age as well as the household income at zero hours of work for both the spouses.
As it can be seen, all terms have the expected sign in both the selection equation
and the main equation. In particular, the higher is the level of education achieved,
the more likely is the participation in the labour market. The same is true if the
couple does not live in southern Italy. All the coeﬃcients in front of the instruments
are significant for the female equation. In particular, female participation is lower
when the couple has a child and this eﬀect increases as the child’s age decreases. As
expected, these variables are less or not significant for male but it is worth noting
that they have the opposite sign with respect to female. Moreover, the higher are
the non-labour sources of income the lower is the probability of participation for
both the spouses. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the correlation coeﬃcient
between the two error terms - rho - is statistically diﬀerent from zero and positive
in both the equations.
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Table 3.1: Wage equations
Female Male
coef z coef z
Log hourly gross wage:
educ2§ 0.299 4.390 0.197 5.790
educ3§ 0.681 7.990 0.422 12.140
educ4§ 1.087 10.190 0.825 17.510
Age† -0.004 -0.270 0.038 2.840
Age squared† 0.021 1.020 -0.029 -1.900
Area1 : Northern§ 0.244 4.080 0.262 9.600
Area2 : Middle§ 0.158 2.800 0.157 4.930
Home owner§ 0.125 3.410 0.111 4.900
constant 1.246 3.440 0.658 2.240
Selection equation:
Net income at 0 hours -0.109 -2.590 -0.218 -4.070
educ2§ 0.439 4.190 0.328 2.520
educ3§ 1.150 10.830 0.523 3.690
educ4§ 1.870 12.460 1.354 3.420
Age† 0.095 2.560 0.190 3.380
Age squared† -0.001 -2.860 -0.002 -3.520
Home owner§ 0.424 6.120 0.360 3.200
Area1 : Northern§ 0.948 12.990 0.864 5.970
Area2 : Middle§ 0.708 8.140 0.811 4.840
Age youngest child : 0/2§ -0.436 -3.710 0.326 1.510
Age youngest child : 3/5§ -0.377 -3.100 0.385 1.710
Age youngest child : 6/9§ -0.330 -2.910 0.370 1.750
Age youngest child : 10/16§ -0.104 -1.310 0.243 1.890
constant -2.074 -2.770 -3.172 -2.660
rho 0.583 4.067 0.289 1.119
sigma 0.449 0.439
Loglikelihood -1595 -1467
Observations 2038 2019
Uncensored obs. 1003 1908
Note: Models estimated by Maximum Likelihood. † denotes that the
variable is measured in terms of deviation from its mean. § denotes
discrete variables. Educ$ are dummies that denote the achieved degree
of education, the comparison group is the lowest level.
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The next tables are related with the child-care demand. Table 2 reported below
shows the distribution of child-care hourly expenditure for those households that
are observed using child-care.
Table 3.2: distribution of hourly child-care cost (euro)
Groups: qtile: 12.5 qtile: 37.5 qtile: 62.5 qtile: 87.5
No kids<=3,South Italy,Low educ 0.180 0.276 0.468 1.920
No kids<=3,South Italy,High educ 0.223 0.325 0.446 1.560
No kids<=3,North of Italy,Low educ 0.333 0.499 0.669 1.404
No kids<=3,North of Italy,High educ 0.324 0.512 0.780 1.560
Kids<=3,South Italy,Low educ 0.195 0.312 0.390 1.560
Kids<=3,South Italy,High educ 0.217 0.364 0.702 2.184
Kids<=3,North of Italy,Low educ 0.429 0.758 1.443 3.432
Kids<=3,North of Italy,High educ 0.333 0.624 0.936 3.343
Note: sample size restricted to households with children in pre-school age.
As expected, the hourly child-care cost is higher, on average, in the northern
Italy and among those households with children aged less than 3 years. Table 3
shows the proportion of each group and the probability of zero spending in child-
care.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics for child-care usage
Groups: % % %zero_exp
No kids<=3,South Italy,Low educ 7.32 mother works 5.79 5.57
No kids<=3,South Italy,Low educ mother not works 1.53 3.39
No kids<=3,South Italy,High educ 7.65 mother works 4.26 2.51
No kids<=3,South Italy,High educ mother not works 3.39 1.53
No kids<=3,North of Italy,Low educ 6.39 mother works 3.88 2.62
No kids<=3,North of Italy,Low educ mother not works 2.51 4.26
No kids<=3,North of Italy,High educ 8.2 mother works 2.62 3.88
No kids<=3,North of Italy,High educ mother not works 5.57 5.79
Kids<=3,South Italy,Low educ 16.56 mother works 14.21 7.6
Kids<=3,South Italy,Low educ mother not works 2.35 15.08
Kids<=3,South Italy,High educ 17.21 mother works 9.62 2.35
Kids<=3,South Italy,High educ mother not works 7.6 8.25
Kids<=3,North of Italy,Low educ 13.99 mother works 7.6 7.6
Kids<=3,North of Italy,Low educ mother not works 15.08 5.74
Kids<=3,North of Italy,High educ 22.68 mother works 8.25 9.62
Kids<=3,North of Italy,High educ mother not works 5.74 14.21
Total 100 100
Note: sample size restricted to households with children in pre-school age. %zero_exp is the
proportion of households that do not use formal childcare.
The proportion of households with zero spending provides evidence that house-
holds with working mothers are more likely to buy formal childcare. Moreover,
the probability of using child-care increases with the mother’s level of education
and it is higher when the household lives in northern Italy. Finally, Table 4 shows
the results of the OLS regressions for the relationship between hours of child-care
and hours of work for the mother. The results are again presented by groups.
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Table 3.4: OLS regression of child-care hours on worked hours
Coeﬀ St. Err z
Hours of Child-care:
1 kid, youngest<=3 worked hours 0.088 0.027 3.28
cons 3.731 0.650 5.74
2 kids, youngest<=3 worked hours 0.121 0.043 2.81
cons 11.335 0.962 11.78
2+ kids, youngest<=3 worked hours 0.428 0.091 4.72
cons 10.735 1.723 6.23
1 kid, youngest>3 worked hours 0.088 0.052 1.70
cons 24.708 1.270 19.45
2 kids, youngest>3 worked hours 0.185 0.053 3.50
cons 26.724 1.141 23.43
2+ kids, youngest>3 worked hours 0.094 0.112 0.84
cons 25.370 2.229 11.38
Note: sample size restricted to households with children in pre-school
age. OLS regression by groups.
As results provided show, the increment in child-care usage for a marginal incre-
ment in the hours of work is higher when the couple has a child under three years
old. This increment is higher when the household has more than two children and
the youngest child is under three years old.
40
3.7. Results from structural model estimates
3.7. Results from structural model estimates
This section provides results for the structural model. The next table shows
estimates for couples using 50 draws22. As it can be seen, most of the coeﬃcients
have the expected sign. Importantly, fixed costs of working are both positive
and highly significant at standard significant levels. On average, they turned out
to be about €2000 per year. Since any restriction has been imposed a priori
on the coeﬃcient signs, it is important to verify the coherence of the estimated
preferences with respect to standard textbook economic theory. In particular,
it is crucial to check if the estimated utility function is quasi-concave in income
for all the observations in the sample. I made this investigation by adapting the
equations 3 and 4 in Van Soest (1995). As a result I found that the utility function
is quasi-concave in income for 99% of the couples in the sample.
22The coeﬃcients obtained with 100 draws are not statistically significant from those obtained with 50
draws. This means that 50 draws are enough to ensure convergence.
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Table 3.5: Structural model estimates for couples
Parameter Coef. z Parameter Coef. z
α1 : constant -0.084 -7.480 β3 : Constant 1.386 13.260
α2 : constant -0.175 -3.330 Husband’s age† 0.544 2.200
α3 : constant -0.384 -25.380 Husband’s age sqrd† -0.079 -2.800
α4 : constant 0.559 3.030 Southern Italy§ -0.248 -3.990
α5 : constant -0.160 -9.100 Husband’s educ. (high)§ 0.011 0.210
α6 : constant 0.033 1.720 Number of children 0.065 1.530
β1 : constant 2.571 12.610 Youngest child 0-6§ 0.055 0.620
Wife’s age† -0.039 -0.450 σ3 0.024 0.168
Husband’s age† 0.131 2.300 γ1 : Constant 0.027 2.455
Southern Italy§ 0.220 1.910 Big city (>40.000) 0.004 0.444
Wife’s educ. (high)§ -0.247 -2.500 Southern Italy§ 0.027 3.857
Husband’s educ. (high)§ -0.016 -0.340 Youngest child 0-6§ -0.003 -0.167
Number of children -0.087 -1.160 Wife’s age† 0.029 2.636
Youngest child 0-6§ -0.030 -0.190 γ2 : Constant 0.012 12.000
σ1 0.157 2.432 Big city (>40.000) 0.001 1.000
β2 : Constant 2.112 6.430 Southern Italy§ -0.001 -0.333
Wife’s age† 0.713 3.610 Youngest child 0-6§ 0.001 0.500
Wife’s age sqrd† -0.092 -4.060 Wife’s age† 0.001 1.000
Southern Italy§ -0.189 -2.030
Wife’s educ. (high)§ 0.027 0.340
Number of children -0.152 -2.650
Youngest child 0-6§ -0.076 -2.547
σ2 0.043 0.748
Log-Likelihood: -3348.3188 Obs: 2002 households
Note: model estimated by Simulated Maximum Likelihood using Halton sequences (50 draws).
Weekly household income divided by 1000; Women and men’s worked hours divided by 10; Random
terms divided by 10; α2 and α3 divided by 100; α4 divide by 1000. § denotes dummy variables and
† denotes that variables are measured in terms of deviation from their means. σs coeﬃcients are
estimated standard deviations. The vectors γ1 and γ2 represent fixed costs of working, γ2 being
the additional cost of working full time.
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If we now turn on the estimated coeﬃcients we can see that most of them are
in line with standard economic guesses. Indeed, as expected, women preferences
for work are decreasing with the number of dependent children, in particular when
the youngest child is aged under than six. For men this pattern is exactly the
opposite. Interestingly, preferences for work decrease for either spouses when they
are from the southern of Italy and increase with own age at a decreasing rate.
Women and men with high levels of education have increasing preferences for
work. Finally, the standard deviation of the income coeﬃcient is significantly
diﬀerent from zero indicating that unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for
income exists in the sample. To check the ability of the model to fit the data, I
computed average probabilities for each category of hours and compared with the
observed frequencies. As it can be seen from the next table, the model is able
to replicate observed frequencies quite well, in particular when women work more
than 10 hours per week.
Table 3.6: Predicted vs observed frequencies
Hours Observed Predicted
Wife: 0 Husband: 0 6.06 5.78
Wife: 0 Husband: 40 33.73 34.85
Wife: 0 Husband: 50 10.66 10.07
Wife: 10 Husband: 0 0.10 0.11
Wife: 10 Husband: 40 1.50 0.92
Wife: 10 Husband: 50 0.20 0.33
Wife: 20 Husband: 0 0.65 0.89
Wife: 20 Husband: 40 7.51 7.38
Wife: 20 Husband: 50 2.60 2.38
Wife: 30 Husband: 0 0.40 0.50
Wife: 30 Husband: 40 4.55 4.69
Wife: 30 Husband: 50 1.20 1.55
Wife: 40 Husband: 0 2.85 2.79
Wife: 40 Husband: 40 21.77 21.24
Wife: 40 Husband: 50 6.21 6.53
Tot 100 100
Once the parameters of the direct utility function are estimated, it is possible
to compute the labour supply elasticities numerically following Creedy and Kalb
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(2005). Firstly, gross hourly wages are increased by 1% and then a new vector
of net household income for each alternative of hours is computed. Secondly, the
probability of each alternative is computed for both the old and the new vector of
net household income by means of the following probabilities:
Pr(Hj|ypij,Xi) =
5￿
s=1
P (psc|Xi)
1
R
R￿
r=1
exp(U(ypij − TCsij,Hj,Xi,νr))￿K
k=1 exp(U(y
p
ik − TCsik,Hk,Xi,νr))
(3.25)
With p=after, before. These probabilities are used to compute the expected labour
supply for each spouse in the couple before and after the policy change23:
E[Hs|ypi , Xi] =
Js￿
j=1
Pr(Hj|ypij,Xi)Hsj (3.26)
With s=men, women and p=after, before. Finally, the labour supply elasticity for
each spouse in the couple can be computed numerically as:
εs =
E[Hs | yafteri ,Xi]− E[Hs | ybeforei ,Xi]
E[Hs | ybeforei ,Xi]
· 1
0.01
(3.27)
With s=men, women. The next table shows such elasticities. However, it is worth
noting that such elasticities have to be interpreted carefully. They are a useful
summary measure of the labour supply behaviour but it has to bear in mind that
they could vary substantially depending on the initial discrete hours level and the
relative change in the gross hourly wages.
23Since husband’s earnings are on average bigger then the wife’s ones, I computed two sets of elasticities
derived from one percentage increase in either the woman gross wage and the man gross wage.
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Table 3.7: Labour supply elasticities by individual characteristics
Husband’s gross wage +1% Wife’s gross wage +1%
All married couples 0.151 0.870
Middle/Northern Italy 0.133 0.788
Southern Italy 0.229 1.240
Couple without children 0.197 0.896
Couple with children 0.106 0.851
Youngest child <6 0.084 0.730
Youngest child>=6 0.129 0.884
Wife older than 45 - 0.989
Wife younger than 30 - 0.837
Wife with high education - 0.621
Wife with low education - 1.112
Husband older than 45 0.203 -
Husband younger than 30 0.148 -
Husband with high education 0.107 -
Husband with low education 0.191 -
Note: High education corresponds to secondary (5 years) or tertiary education.
As it can be seen, labour supply elasticities by household characteristics are
quite in line with the expectations. Female own elasticities are on average bigger
than the male’s one. Moreover, elasticities are bigger in the southern Italy, for
households without children and for partners without high education. The next
table shows average elasticities for each decile of gross equivalent income24. As
it was expected, elasticities are much more higher for low-income households and
this is particularly true for the woman own elasticities. Finally, it can be noticed a
intra-household substitution eﬀect between income and number of working hours
of the partner.
24Equivalent gross household income corresponds to the gross household income divided by the square
root of the number of members.
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Table 3.8: Average elasticities by 10 quantiles of equivalent income
Husband’s gross wage +1% Wife’s gross wage +1%
Decile of gross income own elasticity partner own elasticity partner
1 0.26 -0.19 1.10 0.00
2 0.19 -0.12 1.02 -0.01
3 0.18 -0.04 1.00 0.00
4 0.16 -0.06 1.00 0.00
5 0.16 -0.06 0.97 0.00
6 0.13 -0.08 0.90 -0.01
7 0.13 -0.08 0.84 -0.01
8 0.12 -0.11 0.67 -0.01
9 0.11 -0.15 0.66 -0.01
10 0.02 -0.28 0.49 -0.01
Total 0.15 -0.12 0.87 -0.01
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3.8. Concluding Remarks
This essay has explored the performance of the discrete approach for the estima-
tion of labour supply elasticities for married couple using Italian data. The discrete
approach has several advantages with respect to the continuous one. In particular,
it easily allows for highly non-linear budget sets, non-participation, joint labour
supply and endogenous child-care. Several innovations have been introduced with
respect earlier Italian studies. In particular, we take into account unobserved het-
erogeneity in preferences, child-care expenditures, errors in wage predictions and
unobserved fixed costs of working. Estimated preferences are in line with the eco-
nomic theory. In particular, the marginal utility of income is positive for 99% of
the sample and preferences for work decrease with the number of young children
and increase with age at a decreasing rate. Elasticities are derived numerically.
As expected, the average elasticity of labour supply is higher for female in cou-
ples, in particular for those who belong from low-income households. Average own
elasticities are higher in southern Italy and they are lower for couples with young
children.
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3.9. Appendix
Overview of the STATA routine
Here we explain the routine we wrote for the optimisation algorithm. Stata® has
a powerful built-in optimisation routine that is able to use, even within the same
searching process, diﬀerent optimisation algorithms such as Nr, Bhhh, Dfp, etc.
There are three possible methods to maximise a self-written likelihood function.
The first one, so-called method d0, requires the analyst to provide just the likeli-
hood function. The second one, method d1, requires the computation of both the
likelihood and the gradient. Finally, method d2, requires the computation of the
likelihood, the gradient and the hessian. Whenever a piece of information is not
provided, Stata computes it by numerical approximation, otherwise the algorithm
just fill in the provided formula. Of course methods d2 and d1 are faster, more
precise and stable but they are obviously time demanding. We chose method d0
for our program. The model to be estimated is the one described above. From
a technical point of view it is a mixed conditional logit model. The diﬀerence
with respect to a traditional conditional logit model is the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity in preferences that has to be integrated out during the estimation
process. This random terms are important because they relax the IIA assumption
and give the model more reliability. Integrating out the unobserved factors (here
also child-care prices and the unobserved part of wages for non-workers) produce
a likelihood which is diﬃcult to compute for the presence of a multidimensional
integral. Instead of using traditional quadrature methods to approximate this inte-
gral, we follow Train (2003) and use Simulated Maximum Likelihood with Halton
sequences. The Stata® command mdraws by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) helps
to generate the Halton Sequences from which it is easy to get the correspondent
draws from the multivariate normal distribution. we call the constructed draws
random1_r , random2_r, etc. Notice that r denotes the draw and 1,2,... identify
the random terms. Formally, the utility we defined in the Stata® routine is:
U(yij;Hj;Xi) = α1y2ij + α2hf
2
j + α3hm
2
j+
+α4hfjhmj + α5yijhfj + α6yijhmj+
+(β1x
￿
1 + ν1)yij + (β2x
￿
2 + ν2)hfj + (β3x
￿
3 + ν3)hmj
(3.28)
Where:
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ν ∼ N

 ν1ν2
ν3
 ,
 σ
2
11 σ
2
12 σ
2
13
σ221 σ
2
22 σ
2
23
σ231 σ
2
32 σ
2
33

 (3.29)
And:  ν1ν2
ν3
 =
 c11 0 0c21 c22 0
c31 c32 c33

 random1_rrandom2_r
random3_r
 (3.30)
The matrix
 c11 0 0c21 c22 0
c31 c32 c33
 is a Cholesky decomposition of the variance covari-
ance matrix defined above25. Finally, bear in mind that the contribution to the
Simulated Log-Likelihood for observation i is:
Li =
5￿
s=1
P (psc|Xi)
1
R
R￿
r=1
K￿
j=1
￿
exp(U(yij − TCsij,Hj,Xi,νr))￿K
k=1 exp(U(yik − TCsik,Hk,Xi,νr))
￿dij
(3.31)
In order to simplify the routine, we decided to work in a typical McFadden discrete
choice environment. It means that each observation is replicated as many times
as the number of alternatives she can choose from26. This is done by using the
command expand after have constructed the dependent variable. The dependent
variable is called didep and is a dummy for the observed choice among the 15 pos-
sible alternatives in the choice set27. The next step is to adapt the variables that
change with the alternatives (net income, hours of work, fixed costs and hours of
child-care) to the new McFadden environment. Below the Stata® command are
reported for the steps just described.
***run program mdraws to get two Halton sequences per observation using primes
2,3,5:
matrix p=(2 , 3 ,5)
mdraws, neq(3) dr(50) prefix(c) burn(15) prime(p)
***get normally distributed random number using the two Halton sequences:
25A Cholesky factor is such that:
„
c11 0
c21 c22
«„
c11 c12
0 c22
«
=
„
σ211 σ
2
12
σ221 σ
2
22
«
26In our database each row represents a couple so that we had to construct family variables for all the
individual variables we used in the structural model.
27The choice set is defined by the cartesian product {0,10,20,30,40}x{0,40,50}
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forvalues r=1/50{
gen random1_‘r’=invnorm(c1_‘r’)
gen random2_‘r’=invnorm(c2_‘r’)
gen random3_‘r’=invnorm(c3_‘r’)
}
***generate a variable for the observed choices of both the wife (hour_f) and
of the husband (hour_m):
gen Hc=1 if hour_f==0 & hour_m==0
replace Hc=2 if hour_f==0 & hour_m==40
replace Hc=3 if hour_f==0 & hour_m==50
replace Hc=4 if hour_f==10 & hour_m==0
replace Hc=5 if hour_f==10 & hour_m==40
replace Hc=6 if hour_f==10 & hour_m==50
replace Hc=7 if hour_f==20 & hour_m==0
replace Hc=8 if hour_f==20 & hour_m==40
replace Hc=9 if hour_f==20 & hour_m==50
replace Hc=10 if hour_f==30 & hour_m==0
replace Hc=11 if hour_f==30 & hour_m==40
replace Hc=12 if hour_f==30 & hour_m==50
replace Hc=13 if hour_f==40 & hour_m==0
replace Hc=14 if hour_f==40 & hour_m==40
replace Hc=15 if hour_f==40 & hour_m==50
***now expand the database to get the typical McFadden setup (15 alternatives):
gen strata=_n expand 15
sort strata
***”respfact” ranks the alternatives for each observation:
gen respfact=mod(_n-1,15)+1
*** “didep” is the dependent variables. It takes value one for the choosen
alternative.:
gen didep=(Hc==respfact)
***re-order the net income variable: re-order variables for each draw j from
the wage distribution and for each alterantive (from 1 to 15) in order to get
coloumns with different draws and rows with different alternatives for each
observation:
forvalues j=1/50{
quietly{ gen y‘j’=y1_‘j’ if respfact==1
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replace y‘j’=y2_‘j’ if respfact==2
replace y‘j’=y3_‘j’ if respfact==3
replace y‘j’=y4_‘j’ if respfact==4
replace y‘j’=y5_‘j’ if respfact==5
replace y‘j’=y6_‘j’ if respfact==6
replace y‘j’=y7_‘j’ if respfact==7
replace y‘j’=y8_‘j’ if respfact==8
replace y‘j’=y9_‘j’ if respfact==9
replace y‘j’=y10_‘j’ if respfact==10
replace y‘j’=y11_‘j’ if respfact==11
replace y‘j’=y12_‘j’ if respfact==12
replace y‘j’=y13_‘j’ if respfact==13
replace y‘j’=y14_‘j’ if respfact==14
replace y‘j’=y15_‘j’ if respfact==15
}
}
***scale the income variables:
forvalues j=1/50{
quietly{
replace y‘j’=y‘j’/1000
}
}
***re-order the hours variable so that each row conresponds to an alternative:
gen hf=0 if respfact==1
replace hf=0 if respfact==2
replace hf=0 if respfact==3
replace hf=10 if respfact==4
replace hf=10 if respfact==5
replace hf=10 if respfact==6
replace hf=20 if respfact==7
replace hf=20 if respfact==8
replace hf=20 if respfact==9
replace hf=30 if respfact==10
replace hf=30 if respfact==11
replace hf=30 if respfact==12
replace hf=40 if respfact==13
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replace hf=40 if respfact==14
replace hf=40 if respfact==15
gen hm=0 if respfact==1
replace hm=40 if respfact==2
replace hm=50 if respfact==3
replace hm=0 if respfact==4
replace hm=40 if respfact==5
replace hm=50 if respfact==6
replace hm=0 if respfact==7
replace hm=40 if respfact==8
replace hm=50 if respfact==9
replace hm=0 if respfact==10
replace hm=40 if respfact==11
replace hm=50 if respfact==12
replace hm=0 if respfact==13
replace hm=40 if respfact==14
replace hm=50 if respfact==15
***generate interaction terms (scaled):
gen double hfhm=(hf*hm)/1000
***quadratic terms: gen double hfsq=(hf^2)/100
gen double hmsq=(hm^2)/100
***hours constraints (fixed costs of working):
gen fc1=(Hc>=4)
gen fc2=(Hc>9)
***create interaction between fc1, fc2 and household characteristics
note: imputs omitted for simplicity
***scale hm and hf:
replace hf=hf/10
replace hm=hm/10
***re-order the variable that indicate hours of child-care for each alternative:
gen hc=hcc0 if respfact==1
replace hc=hcc0 if respfact==2
replace hc=hcc0 if respfact==3
replace hc=hcc10 if respfact==4
replace hc=hcc10 if respfact==5
replace hc=hcc10 if respfact==6
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replace hc=hcc20 if respfact==7
replace hc=hcc20 if respfact==8
replace hc=hcc20 if respfact==9
replace hc=hcc30 if respfact==10
replace hc=hcc30 if respfact==11
replace hc=hcc30 if respfact==12
replace hc=hcc40 if respfact==13
replace hc=hcc40 if respfact==14
replace hc=hcc40 if respfact==15
The next step is to define the maximisation algorithm. For an introduction to
Stata® ML algorithm see Gould et al. (2006). Once all the temporary variables
that are used in the algorithm have been defined, (see below) the variances and
the covariances of the random terms have to be computed28. Then the covariance
matrix “f” can be filled in, and the Cholesky decomposition can be computed.
After that, the routine starts a double loop whose aim is adding up all the sin-
gle contributions to the likelihood for any possible combination of draws from the
unobserved components and from the child-care distribution. In particular, for a
given draw r from the wage distribution and from the multivariate normal distri-
butions, the contribution to the likelihood for each single observation is computed
5 times in order to integrate out child-care prices. Indeed, for a given draw r and
a given child-care price, it is possible to compute the three random terms and the
net income minus childcare expenditure and fixed costs. Next, the utility index
and the conditional logistic probability can be filled in. This process runs 5 times,
one for each mass point of the child-care cost distribution (included the point for
zero costs). These values are then weighted for the probability that a particular
child-care price is observed29. This process is carried out 50 times, which is the
chosen number of draws from the wage and the random terms distribution. Given
28What is estimated is the logarithm of the standard deviation in order to constraint the variances to
be positive. For the covariances we estimate the inverse hyperbolic tangent of the correlation terms.
29This is done with the command cond(x,y,z). In the previous sections we explained that child-care
expenditure can be considered only when the couple has a child under 7 years old. When it appends,
5 prices are available for each observation, otherwise the prices are automatically set to zero. When
price is zero and the couple has a young child, the weights that are applied are diﬀerent so as to take
into account that the probability of zero expenditure in child-care depends on the mother’s working
status. As it can be seen in the routine below, if the couple does not have a young child, the command
cond(-) always picks up the variable prob0, which, for these couples without young children, is fix
at 0.2 (given that there are 5 choices per observation). In this way no change appends for these
observations when the single contributions are added up in the subsequent line.
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that for each of these draws the contribution to the likelihood is evaluated 5 times
for each observation, the loop has to take into account 250 contributions for each
observation at the same time30. Finally, these single contributions are added up
into the variable L2. The last step is to pick up for each observation only the
contributions that corresponds to the observed choice and to average them over
the 50 draws.
*******************************
***Maximum Likelihood Model**
*******************************
sort strata Hc
program define clogit_sim_d0
args todo b lnf tempvar L1 L2 beta1 beta2 beta3 gamma1 gamma2 numer sum denom
tempname alpha1 alpha2 alpha3 alpha4 alpha5 alpha6 sigma1 lnsig1 l11 sigma2
lnsig2 l22 sigma3 lnsig3 l33 atrho21 atrho31 atrho32 l21 l31 l32 cov21 cov31
cov32
local d "$ML_y1"
mleval ‘alpha1’ = ‘b’, eq(1)
scalar mleval ‘alpha2’ = ‘b’, eq(2)
scalar mleval ‘alpha3’ = ‘b’, eq(3)
scalar mleval ‘alpha4’ = ‘b’, eq(4)
scalar mleval ‘alpha5’ = ‘b’, eq(5)
scalar mleval ‘alpha6’ = ‘b’, eq(6)
scalar mleval ‘beta1’ = ‘b’, eq(7)
mleval ‘beta2’ = ‘b’, eq(8)
mleval ‘beta3’ = ‘b’, eq(9)
mleval ‘gamma1’ = ‘b’, eq(10)
mleval ‘gamma2’ = ‘b’, eq(11)
mleval ‘lnsig1’ = ‘b’, eq(12) scalar
mleval ‘lnsig2’ = ‘b’, eq(13) scalar
mleval ‘lnsig3’ = ‘b’, eq(14) scalar
mleval ‘atrho21’ = ‘b’, eq(15) scalar
mleval ‘lnsig31’ = ‘b’, eq(16) scalar
mleval ‘lnsig32’ = ‘b’, eq(17) scalar
30In our PC with 4MB of RAM and 2.2Ghz Intel core duo processor, the maximisation process lasts for
more than 20 hours.
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qui gen double ‘L1’=0
qui gen double ‘L2’=0
qui gen double ‘numer’=0
qui gen double ‘sum’=0
qui gen double ‘denom’=0
scalar ‘sigma1’=(exp(‘lnsig1’))^2
scalar ‘sigma2’=(exp(‘lnsig2’))^2
scalar ‘sigma3’=(exp(‘lnsig3’))^2
scalar ‘cov21’=[exp(2*‘atrho21’)-1]/[exp(2*‘atrho21’)+1]*(exp(‘lnsig2’))*(exp(‘lnsig1’))
scalar ‘cov31’=[exp(2*‘atrho31’)-1]/[exp(2*‘atrho31’)+1]*(exp(‘lnsig3’))*(exp(‘lnsig1’))
scalar ‘cov32’=[exp(2*‘atrho32’)-1]/[exp(2*‘atrho32’)+1]*(exp(‘lnsig3’))*(exp(‘lnsig2’))
matrix f= (‘sigma1’ , ‘cov21’ , ‘cov31’ \ ‘cov21’ , ‘sigma2’ , ‘cov32’ \ ‘cov31’
, ‘cov32’ , ‘sigma3’)
capture matrix U=cholesky(f)
scalar ‘l11’=U[1,1]
scalar ‘l21’=U[2,1]
scalar ‘l31’=U[3,1]
scalar ‘l32’=U[3,2]
scalar ‘l33’=U[3,3]
forvalues r=1/50{
forvalues c=0/4{
qui gen double ‘random1’=random1_‘r’*‘l11’
qui gen double ‘random2’=random_1‘r’*‘l21’+ random2_‘r’*‘l22’
qui gen double ‘random3’=random_1‘r’*‘l31’+ random2_‘r’*‘l32’+ random_3‘r’*‘l33’
qui gen double ‘y’=y‘r’-hc*p‘c’-‘gamma1’-‘gamma2’
qui gen double ‘yhf’=‘y’*hf
qui gen double ‘yhm’=‘y’*hm
qui gen double ‘ysq’=‘y’^2
qui gen double ‘utility’=‘alpha1’*‘ysq’+‘alpha2’*hfsq+‘alpha3’*hmsq+‘alpha4’*hfhm
+‘alpha5’*‘yhf’+‘alpha6’*‘yhm’+(‘beta1’+‘random1’)*‘y’+(‘beta2’+‘random2’)*hf+
(‘beta3’+‘random3’)*hm
qui gen double ‘numer’=exp(‘utility’)
qui by strata: gen double ‘sum’=sum(‘numer’)
qui by strata: gen double ‘denom’=‘sum’[_N]
qui gen double ‘L1’=(‘numer’/‘denom’)*cond(p‘c’==0,prob0,prob1*0.25)
qui replace ‘L2’=‘L1’+‘L2’
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drop ‘y’ ‘yhf’ ‘yhm’ ‘ysq’ ‘numer’ ‘sum’ ‘denom’ ‘L1’ ‘utility’ ‘random1’ ‘random2’
‘random3’
}
}
mlsum ‘lnf’=ln(‘L2’/50)
if ‘d’==1 if (‘todo’==0 | ‘lnf’>=. ) exit
}
end
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4.1. Introduction
The reform of the personal income tax and more generally of the tax-benefit system
has recently become a very controversial topic in Italy. In the last 15 years any
new government, either from the left or from the right, has started its mandate
with the intention of implementing some radical reform, but it has always ended
with modest adjustments with respect to the announced claims. However the tax-
benefit structure has significantly changed over the last six years, possibly creating
important eﬀects in terms of redistribution and labour supply incentives.
Many studies have examined the theoretical problems inherent in the design of
a consistent reform of the Italian personal income tax (for example, De Vincenti
et al., 2005). Others have focused on the distributive impacts of some of the
recent reforms, considering their social welfare implications and changes in eﬀective
marginal tax rates (Baldini and Bosi, 2002, Gastaldi and Liberati, 2005). The
empirical papers that have considered specific cases of reform of the Italian tax-
benefit system have so far made use of static microsimulation models, without
consideration for possible labour supply eﬀects, apart from calculating changes in
eﬀective marginal rates.
A given modification of the structure of marginal tax rates, however, can be
followed by very diﬀerent eﬃciency consequences, depending on the magnitude of
labour supply elasticities and on their distribution across the population. Many
recent papers focus on the possible equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀs implicit in any tax or
benefit reform, and introduce in traditional static microsimulation models reaction
functions by taxpayers and other family members. These studies have been applied
to the equity and eﬃciency eﬀects of the implementation, in Italy, of some basic
structural reforms of the tax-benefit system (Aaberge et al., 1998), as the switch
to a negative income tax (Aaberge et al., 2000) or the introduction of a guaranteed
income scheme (Berliri and Parisi, 2006; Mancini, 2007).
In this paper we use a structural microsimulation model that allows to consider
both the distributive and the eﬃciency eﬀects of a given reform. We focus not
on hypothetical general reforms of the whole system of personal taxation, but on
three adjustments of the structure of the Italian personal income tax that have
actually taken place in the last few years. The results show what would have hap-
pened to income distribution and labour supply if the only change in the economic
environment had been represented by the modifications in the personal income tax
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and, in one case, in family benefits. In this sense, they do not correspond to what
has actually taken place, because changes in the tax-benefit system are only one
of the many factors that can influence variations in inequality and labour supply
during a given period of time. These simulations capture the “pure” eﬀects of the
reforms, something that cannot be easily observed in cross-sectional data.
The model that we use integrates a detailed static tax-benefit simulator with a
household labour supply model based on the Banca d’Italia survey on household
income and wealth (SHIW). We study the eﬀects of the three most recent reforms
of the personal income tax on income distribution and on incentives, and show
whether and in which occasions equity and eﬃciency moved in the same direction
or followed diﬀerent paths.
The next section describes the evolution of the Italian personal income tax over
the past six years. In section 4 we introduce the empirical framework for our
analysis. Section 5 contains the results and section 6 concludes.
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4.2. The recent evolution of the Italian personal income tax
We simulate the eﬀects of three subsequent reforms of the personal income tax
(Irpef, i.e. Imposta sul reddito delle persone fisiche) that have taken place in Italy
over the last few years. These changes were inspired by very diﬀerent intellectual
benchmarks, but none of them has come close to a complete and consistent reform.
They are mainly partial attempts that have left the most important component of
the Italian tax system in what is now an uncertain and unstable equilibrium.
The starting point of our analysis is the structure that Irpef had before all the
reforms we simulate. Since the first of them come into force in the fiscal year 2003,
we must adopt as a base case for our simulations the characteristics of Irpef in
2002. Here we sketch the main traits of the personal income tax before and after
each of the reforms.
4.2.1. Irpef 2002
During the fiscal year 2002, the individual taxable income is subject to five brack-
ets, with the lowest rate at 18% and the highest at 45% (starting from 70,000
euros). Progressivity is realised also through a series of tax credits, all piecewise
decreasing with respect to income, so as to further strengthen the rise in the ef-
fective average tax rate: for dependent spouse, for children (starting at about 500
euros for each child for middle-low income levels), for dependent workers and pen-
sioners (decreasing with respect to income from 1,150 to 52 euros), and for the
self-employed (from 573 to 52 euros). The presence of these tax credits produces
a minimum level of income that is exempt from the tax. This no-tax area corre-
sponds to 6,200 euros for dependent workers and pensioners, and to 3,100 euros
for independent workers.
4.2.2. Irpef 2003
The first of the two reforms operated by the centre-right government became ef-
fective in the fiscal year 2003. The number of rates was maintained at 5, but
with changes in the first three rates. This reform had eﬀects for low and middle
incomes, and replaced the tax credits for earned incomes and pensions with deduc-
tions. The tax credits for dependent family members were maintained. The new
deductions had therefore the main aim of guaranteeing a no-tax area, whose levels
were also raised from 6,200 to 7,500 euros for dependent workers, from 6,200 to
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7,000 for pensioners, and from 3,100 to 4,500 euros for the self-employed. To fur-
ther enhance the progressivity eﬀect, the tax deductions were defined as a linearly
inverse function of income, falling to zero for incomes greater than 33,500 euros for
dependent workers, 30,500 for the self-employed and 33,000 for pensioners. The
reduction in tax revenue from these changes has been estimated in 6 billions euros.
4.2.3. Irpef 2005
The second module of reform accomplished by the centre-right government re-
placed also the family-related tax credits with deductions (linearly decreasing with
income like the no-tax area deductions) and reduced the number of brackets from
5 to 4. The highest tax rate has been cut by two percentage points, from 45% to
43%. This top rate applies to the income share exceeding 100,000 euros. Under
Irpef 2003, the 45% rate applied instead to incomes starting from 70,000 euros.
While the 2003 reform benefited middle and low incomes, this reform provided tax
rebates for the highest deciles of the income distribution.
The reduction of the top rate and its application to a narrower bracket were steps
that the government took along a path that had, as a final objective, a structure
of the personal income tax based on only two brackets: the first one up to 100,000
euros, taxed at 23%, and the rest subject to the 33% rate. Progressivity would have
been further enhanced by a deduction decreasing with income. The intellectual
reference point of the whole reform action of the centre-right government in this
context is clearly the flat-rate tax, with a limited degree of progressivity and the
application of the same legal tax rate (23%) to the great majority of taxpayers.
The cost of this second piece of reform has been broadly similar to that of the first
one, around 6 billion euros.
4.2.4. Irpef 2007
The flat-tax plan could not be completed because of fears of excessive revenue
losses, and above all because the objective of a two-rate scheme was not shared by
the centre-left government that took power in 2006. In the budget law for 2007
the new coalition introduced a deep change in the structure of the personal income
tax, which is still basically eﬀective. The top rate has been kept at 43%, but now
applies to incomes above 75,000 euros. The main deductions have been replaced
by tax credits, all linearly decreasing with respect to income. Formal tax rates
61
4. The recent reforms of the Italian personal income tax: distributive and eﬃciency eﬀects
have been reduced for middle-low incomes, but raised for those earning more than
40,000 euros (or more, if the taxpayer has dependent family members). Unlike the
two previous reforms, this one accounted for a deep restructuring in cash transfers
for households with children (Assegno al nucleo familiare). Before the reform,
this benefit decreased in a piecewise way with respect to family income, therefore
producing high marginal eﬀective tax rates and risks of poverty traps. Now its
amounts have been increased, and its structure is linearly decreasing with respect
to family income.
According to oﬃcial estimates, this complex reform has had a very limited cost:
the reduction of the tax burden and the rise in family benefits for middle and low
incomes have been financed by taxpayers with higher incomes or without children.
The intellectual paradigm of the centre-left coalition was completely diﬀerent from
that of the preceding government: the Prodi government tried to move the first
steps towards a negative income tax scheme, integrating together in a consistent
scheme the personal income tax and cash transfers to families with children, so
as to guarantee an income support to taxpayers with family burdens and low
incomes. This objective, however, had a life even shorter than the flat-rate tax
scheme, given the rapid fall of the government and its replacement with a new
centre-right coalition, in power since May 2008. The new government has not
introduced any relevant modification in the personal income tax so far.
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4.3. Empirical Methodology and data
In order to evaluate the distributive and work incentive eﬀects produced by the
last three reforms of the Italian personal income tax, we make use of the be-
havioural microsimulation model introduced in chapter three. The model has two
main parts: a static detailed simulator of the Italian tax-benefit system for each
reform - MAPP02 - and a microeconometric labour supply model based on utility
maximising agents. The static model recovers gross earnings from net earnings
provided in the survey. In this way, it is possible to compute net household in-
come for each possible tax-scenario so as to analyse the changes in the income
distribution from one reform to the other.
However, any conclusion based on the static distributional analysis is partial
because it does not take into account eﬃciency considerations. In order to consider
this latter aspect, we make use of the second part of our model that allows us to
compute labour supply changes from one reform to the other. In this chapter we
allow for a flexible labour supply only for couples and consider singles as being
fixed on the observed labour supply behaviour.
As we have explained in chapter three, we use a unitary model of labour supply.
Given the unitary framework, we consider the couple as the decision maker, which
means that the two spouses choose simultaneously a combination of hours of work
for each of them in order to maximise a joint utility function defined over the net
household income and the hours of work of both partners.
Moreover, the labour supply model we develop is based on a discrete choice
framework. In other words, we treat the number of average weekly worked hours
contained in our database as a category variable and consider the couple as a
utility maximising agent who chooses the combination of both worked hours and
net income that gives the highest utility. As we have seen in the previous chapter,
the main advantage of the discrete choice framework is its versatility in dealing
with problems like non-participation and non-convex budget sets.
Our main source of data is the survey on household income and wealth (SHIW)
that is conducted by the Banca d’Italia every two years. The survey collects very
detailed information on income as well as social and demographic characteristics.
In the present study we focus on the cross sectional survey for the year 2002.
The database is representative of the whole Italian population and contains about
21,000 observations and 8,000 households.
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As we have argued in the previous chapter, our model of labour supply is not ap-
propriate to describe the labour supply decisions of any kind of household. Hence,
we allow for a flexible labour supply only for a selected sub-sample of the whole
population. In particular, we do not consider couples with spouses who are aged
over 60 years, those who are self-employed, involved in a full time education pro-
gram or serving the Army1.
The discrete set of hours each spouse can choose from is mainly defined according
to the empirical distributions observed in SHIW 2002, which are shown in picture
1 of chapter three. According to these distributions, married women are restricted
to choose from the discrete set x={0, 10, 20, 30, 40}, while for married men we
select the discrete set y={0, 40, 50}. Since the labour supply for married women
and men is estimated jointly, each couple has a choice set defined by the Cartesian
product yx that leads to 15 possible combinations of discrete points. Table 2.1
summarises the observed distribution of worked weekly hours according to these
categories.
Table 4.1: Observed distribution of workers by weekly hours
Hours, men 0 (6.36%) 40
(72.22%)
50
(21.42%)
Total
Hours, women
0 71.65 48.58 50.47 50.45
10 1.57 2.08 0.93 1.8
20 3.94 10.88 12.38 10.76
30 3.15 6.44 6.07 6.16
40 19.69 32.02 30.14 30.83
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: our computations on SHIW data. Sub-sample with flexible
labour supply.
To compute net household incomes for each alternative we use our static mi-
crosimulation model. This model allows us to recover the gross hourly wages for
those who are employed. Gross hourly wages correspond to gross weekly earn-
ings from employment divided by average weekly hours of work declared in the
1As explained in chapter three, we make use of another database to recover information about child-care
costs and child-care usage. The source of data is the survey “MULTISCOPO” 1998 on Households
and Childhood Conditions that is conducted by the Italian national institute of statistics.
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database. For people observed as not employed, gross hourly wages are estimated
controlling for sample selection2.
Once the hours of work have been discretised and gross wage been recovered for
all the population of interest, potential gross earnings from employment for each
category of worked hours are obtained by multiplying gross hourly wages by the
representative hours of work in each category3. Then, the static tax-benefit simu-
lator computes total benefit entitlements and total tax amounts for each potential
gross annual income from employment given non-labour incomes. The net incomes
are then computed by subtracting taxes and adding benefits plus non-taxable in-
comes to the gross labour income. This amount is then added up over the two
spouses to get the total net household incomes for each alternative.
Each couple has a choice set defined over net household incomes and hours of
work of either spouses and chooses the alternative that produces the maximum
utility given the actual tax-benefit system and individual characteristics. Under
the assumption that utility is not deterministic, it is then possible to recover the
probability of a given choice, which allow estimating the preference parameters by
maximum likelihood.
The labour supply model we have presented in chapter three is flexible and allows
for many important extensions related to the labour supply choice of married
couples. In particular, it takes into account endogenous fixed costs of working,
unobserved preference heterogeneity for consumption and leisure of either spouses,
endogenous child-care expenditures and errors in wage predictions for non-workers.
A detailed explanation of the model was presented in the previous chapter.
2See the wage generating process outlined in chapter three, equations 7-9.
3Notice the assumption that gross hourly wages do not depend on the amount of worked hours. See
Brewer et al. (2006) for this point.
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4.4. Empirical results
4.4.1. First-round distributive eﬀects
Fig. 1a shows the eﬀects of the various reforms on average equivalent disposable
incomes of households, ordered by deciles of gross equivalent income in 2002, i.e.
equivalent income before the application of the personal income tax and of family
benefits4. In the figure we present changes in disposable equivalent incomes, due
simply to the modification of fiscal parameters (in all reforms) and family benefits
(only in 2007), without any behavioural reaction. The first reform, form 2002 to
2003, had a modest redistributive eﬀect, with the third decile benefiting from the
highest relative change in disposable income. The gain then declines smoothly
for the richest deciles. It is very low also for the poorest 10% of households be-
cause many of them were already exempt from the personal income tax. The
second reform, in 2005, has completely diﬀerent distributive eﬀects, with percent-
age changes in income always increasing from the poorest to the richest deciles.
Finally, the adjustments introduced by the centre-left coalition in 2007 resemble
those of the first centre-right module: the highest gains are achieved by the third
and fourth decile. Unlike that reform, however, this episode resulted in a reduction
in disposable income for the richest households.
4Equivalent household income is household disposable income divided by the square root of the number
of members.
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Figure 4.1a: Percentage changes in equivalent disposable income - entire population
Focusing only on households with at least one child under 14 (Fig. 1b), the
total eﬀect of the three reforms is more generous with them than with the whole
population mainly because of the 2007 reform, which turns out to have particularly
benefited households with children and below median income. The income gains
of the poorest households with children, however, have been very modest.
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Figure 4.1b: Percentage changes in equivalent disposable income - households
with at least one child under 14
Finally, Fig. 1c presents income changes only for households for whom we have
simulated the possibility of changing labour supply5. The distributive eﬀects are
very similar to those of the other two figures.
5As it has been clarified in chapter three, the sub-sample with flexible labour supply corresponds to
households of couples with both spouses in working age. From this sample are excluded households
with self-employed spouses.
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Figure 4.1c: Percentage changes in equivalent disposable income - households
with flexible labour supply
Table 2 shows the Gini indexes for disposable equivalent income, before and
after each simulated reform, for the whole sample representative of the Italian
population. The first reform module of 2003 reduced, as expected, inequality, but
has been followed by another reform that went in the opposite direction. The
centre-left reform, on the other hand, has had a more significant eﬀect in reducing
inequality. At the end of the period, inequality has been very slightly reduced: the
percentage reduction from Gini 2002 to Gini 2007 is -0.94%.
Table 4.2: Gini Index and percentage change
with respect to the previous year
Gini index % change
2002 0.35 -
2003 0.34 -0.51%
2005 0.35 0.44%
2007 0.34 -0.86%
Source: our computations on SHIW 2002 - whole sample
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4.4.2. Accounting for labour supply changes
This section considers the changes in labour supply that, according to the be-
havioural microsimulation model, have been induced by each reform of the per-
sonal income tax. Table 5 summarises the (expected) distribution of women and
men by classes of worked hours under the 2002 legislation and after each reform.
Table 4.3: Distribution of women
and men by groups of weekly hours
of work
Women
2002% 2003% 2005% 2007%
0 hours 0.51 0.5 0.49 0.5
10 hours 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
20 hours 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
30 hours 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
40 hours 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
Total 1 1 1 1
Men
2002% 2003% 2005% 2007%
0 hours 0.06 0.06 0.06
40 hours 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73
50 hours 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22
Total 1 1 1 1
Source: our computations based on SHIW
The changes induced by the modifications of PIT and child benefits are quite
small. Focusing on the extensive margin, female labour supply increases after the
first two reforms, but decreases slightly in 2007. Grossing up our results, we can
estimate an increment of about 47,900 workers among women in couples for the
2003 reform. The 2005 module implies another increment of about 14,500 units,
while the last reform reduced female participation by almost 24,000 units. During
the whole period 2002-2007, women labour supply is then expected to have risen
70
4.4. Empirical results
by about 38,400 units6. For men in couples the corresponding changes are smaller.
All the three reforms increase men participation rates, in particular the last two.
Grossed-up eﬀects for men correspond to +13,000 between 2002 and 2003, +7,700
between 2003 and 2005, +6,000 between 2005 and 2007. At the end of the overall
period, men’s labour supply is expected to have increased by about 26,700 units
due to tax and benefit reforms. If we now focus on the intensive margin, the
2003 reform increases in particular full-time jobs for women in couples. The 2005
module has eﬀects on the number of part-time jobs instead. Finally, the 2007
reform reduces part-time jobs and does not change incentives for full-time work.
For men the pattern is quite diﬀerent. The only reform that actually produces
changes at the intensive margin is the 2005 one. In 2007 there are no significant
eﬀects with respect to the preceding reform. Figures 2a and 2b show each variation
in labour supply with respect to the previous reform for married women and men
respectively. The number shown are simply the diﬀerences between the percentages
contained in table 5. The graphs provide also the overall variations with respect
to the baseline year.
Figure 4.2a: Changes in the distribution of workers by classes of
weekly hours of work - married women
6It is worth stressing again that our results account for just a pure labour supply eﬀect and cannot be
compared with “real” employment data.
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Figure 4.2b: Changes in the distribution of workers by classes of
weekly hours of work - married men
From these two figures a complementarity between the 2003 and 2005 reforms
emerges. Indeed, both reforms increase participation, but the second module of
the centre-right coalition increases part-time jobs whilst the first one provides
stronger incentives for full-time jobs for women. Instead, the 2007 reform reduces
participation and part-time work and does not have significant eﬀects on full time
work with respect to the 2005 reform.
The second of the two graphs presents the same computations for men. As it
can be seen, the changes are smaller than those for women. In general, all the
reforms increase men participation with respect to the baseline year. Analysing
the intensive margin, we observe opposite patterns in 2003 and 2005. In particular,
the 2003 reform slightly reduces over-work incentives and stimulates full-time jobs.
However, the 2005 reform increases over-work incentives to the detriment of full-
time jobs. Finally, the 2007 reform acts in the same direction of the 2003 one,
increasing the incentive to work full-time and reducing over-work slightly.
These findings have a clear rationale in the interaction between the reforms and
the labour supply dynamics implied in our model. In particular, many simulation
exercises that we do not report here have shown that the simple extension of
the no-tax area has positive labour supply incentives, in particular for low-income
households, whilst increasing cash benefits may result in a negative eﬀect on labour
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supply7. Since these interventions produce possibly contrasting incentives, the
labour supply pattern observed for each reform may be diﬃcult to disentangle.
However, these exercises may still help to understand the overall labour supply
pattern as each reform has clear characteristics in terms of its main interventions
and directions.
In particular, the 2003 reform significantly expands the no-tax area. This clearly
has positive eﬀects on participation mainly for households that have low wage rates,
as an increase in labour supply may not change the tax burden. Hence, we expect
the labour supply to increase for this type of households, characterised by high
elasticities to marginal tax rates.
The 2005 reform reduces the tax rate for high-income households, but this turns
out to have low incentive eﬀects as high-income households have small labour
supply elasticities. Hence, the main eﬀects of the 2005 reform are expected to
come from the overall change in the tax brackets and by the replacement of the
family-related tax credits with deductions that linearly decrease with income.
Finally, the 2007 reform significantly increases benefits for households by means
of a new system of tax-credits and cash transfers for households with dependent
children. Importantly, these new tax-credits and cash transfers decrease with
income at a relatively lower withdrawal rate if compared with the past schedule.
Moreover, cash transfers are now significantly higher, in particular for low-income
households. From our simulation exercises we found that the new structure of
cash-benefits has had negative labour supply eﬀects, whilst the extension in the
withdrawal rate of the new tax-credits has ambiguous labour supply incentives as
it does not automatically mean a reduction in eﬀective marginal tax rates for all
income units.
As it has been shown in the previous table, this reform has had an overall neg-
ative eﬀect on both participation and part-time incentives, because both the child
cash transfer and the tax credits for children are linearly decreasing with respect
to income (household income in the case of cash transfers, individual income for
tax credits), thereby raising the eﬀective marginal tax rates to which women are
exposed. This is expected to be particularly true for couples with children, as this
group benefits more from this reform.
In order to check this latter point, the next table shows the diﬀerences in the
labour supply distributions by classes of weekly hours worked for the sub-samples
7The results of these simulation exercises are available upon request.
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of women with and without dependent children.
Table 4.4: Changes in the distribution of women by classes of weekly
hours of work and presence of dependent children
Couples without dependent children Couples with dependent children
Hours var 02-03 var 03-05 var 05-07 var 02-03 var 03-05 var 05-07
0 -0.91 -0.2 0.29 -0.87 -0.43 0.6
10 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.05
20 0.12 0.15 -0.24 0.07 0.24 -0.5
30 0.17 0.03 -0.01 0.16 0.07 -0.08
40 0.63 0.01 -0.01 0.66 0.06 0.03
Source: our computations based on SHIW data
Interestingly, the variation in the labour supply distributions across hours classes
is significantly diﬀerent in the two sub-samples, in particular for the last reform.
Indeed, comparing the variations from 2005 to 2007 in the two sub-samples we
observe very diﬀerent magnitudes, in particular for the extensive margin (.29 versus
.6) and part-time alternatives (-.24 versus -.50). Hence, we could conclude that
the 2007 reform has had a negative impact on participation incentives and on
part-time jobs, in particular for women with young children.
4.4.3. Labour supply and income distribution
In this section we perform a distributive analysis of the eﬀects of the reforms allow-
ing for changes in labour supply behaviour, i.e. how changes in hours worked and
hence in labour income have modified the distribution of net household incomes.
This kind of analysis is complicated by the probabilistic nature of the labour sup-
ply model. In other words, the couples that in our database are allowed to change
their labour supply have a positive probability of choosing any of the labour supply
categories. Hence, if we categorise K possible alternatives of worked hours and
there are N observations, we have KN possible income distributions and hence KN
possible measures of the selected inequality index.
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In theory, the best choice would be to consider all these possible distributions
and compute a particular inequality measure KN times. Then, the correct statistic
would be a weighted average of all these inequality indexes with weights equal to
the probabilities of each income distribution. Of course, this approach is not
practicable even with very few hour categories and few observations in the sample.
Diﬀerent approaches have been proposed in the literature to solve this compu-
tational problem8. Here we adopt the pseudo-distribution technique proposed by
Creedy et al. (2006). In practise, consider a sample of N couples allowed to have K
possible labour supply alternatives. Then, we create a KN income vector with the
KN th row representing the income that the N th couple would have if she chose the
K thalternative. Each unit is weighted by the probability of observing that partic-
ular labour supply choice to create the pseudo-distribution. Creedy et al. (2006)
show that standard inequality indexes computed using this pseudo-distribution
converge to the real values quicker than other methods, in particular when the
number of observation increases9.
In our model there are households of singles and particular households of cou-
ples that have a fixed labour supply. In these cases, the probability attached to
these records is set equal to 1. Any possible distributive analysis allowing for
labour supply behaviour is implemented in this paper using this pseudo-income
distribution.
Figure 3 shows the absolute variations in the labour supply distribution from
one reform to the other along the various deciles of gross equivalent income and
for each category of worked hours10.
For example, the dotted line in the top-left graph shows the absolute variation in
the participation rates of married women between the 2003 reform and the baseline
year for each decile of equivalent income. As this line shows, married women in
the first decile are those that increase participation the least with respect to the
participation rate of the 2002 distribution (0.8% more). Deciles from the fourth
trough the seventh one increase the participation rate the most (about 1.5% more).
The continuous line in the same graph shows the variations in each decile between
the participation rates implied in the 2007 reform, while the remaining line contains
8See Creedy et al. (2006) for a review.
9Convergence gets very fast when there are more than 50 observations.
10Deciles are computes using the pseudo-distribution methods either. This means that (equivalent) gross
incomes are obtained for each alternative available to each couple and the nk vector so computed is
weighted by the probability of choosing each alternative.
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the variations between the participation rates of 2003 and 2005.
We present four graphs constructed in this way, three for women in couples
and the last one for men in couples. Each graph focuses on a particular hour
category. For women in couples we show results for participation (zero hours of
work), part-time jobs (from 10 to 20 hours per week) and full-time jobs (from 30
to 40 hours per week) while for men in couple we present only the variations in
the participation rates.
Focusing on the extensive margin for women in couples (top left graph), we
can see that the 2003 and 2005 reforms have increased women participation, in
particular for the middle class. The 2005 reform has had negative eﬀects on work
incentives for women in couples in the ninth decile if compared with the 2003
reform. The 2007 reform has had a negative impact on female participation, in
particular for the third and fourth deciles, perhaps due to the income eﬀect of
child benefits. This latter reform has better incentives with respect to the 2005
reform for the top two deciles.
Turning to the intensive margin, the 2003 reform has strongly raised part-time
jobs in the top deciles, while it has had a low negative eﬀect for the middle deciles.
The 2005 reform has had exactly the opposite pattern with respect to the 2003
one. Indeed, it increased part-time jobs for the middle class with almost no impact
in the highest deciles but the very last one. The 2007 reform has had a completely
diﬀerent impact with respect to the 2005 reform. In particular, it has reduced
part-time work incentives for almost all the deciles with the exception of the very
last one. The highest reduction is registered for the third, fourth and fifth deciles.
Full-time incentives for women in couples (third graph) have increased after the
2003 and 2005 reforms. Again, this is true in particular for the middle deciles.
It is worth noting that the 2005 reform has not had significant eﬀects in the top
deciles and had a negative impact for the ninth one if compared with the 2003
distribution. With respect to the 2005 reform, the 2007 one has had a slightly
negative impact on female full-time incentives till the seventh decile.
For men in couples (fourth graph), the analysis of the extensive margin shows
that work incentives are positive for all the reforms in almost all the deciles even
though the magnitudes of these incentives are smaller compared with those of
women. As for women, the highest changes are registered for the middle-low
income classes. Interestingly, the 2005 reform reduces men participation in the
top decile with respect to the 2003 reform.
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Figure 4.3: Changes in the distribution of workers by deciles of family income
and types of work eﬀort
Source: own computations based on SHIW data
We now turn to synthetic measures of income inequality to assess the overall
distributive eﬀect of each reform. The next table shows the static Gini indexes
of the whole income distribution, and the percentage changes in the Gini with
respect to the previous year, computed both with and without the consideration
of labour supply changes.
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Table 4.5. Behavioural Gini index of household disposable
income before and after the reforms
Year 2002 2003 2005 2007
Static Gini 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.34
% Variation:
Static Gini - -0.51% 0.44% -0.86%
Gini with labour supply eﬀects - -0.68% 0.32% -0.91%
Source: our computations based on SHIW
The 2003 reform reduces inequality even more when labour supply is accounted
for. The percentage increment of the Gini index in 2005 is smaller with respect to
the static case while the 2007 reform produces a percentage reduction in inequality
substantially similar to that of the static case. The principal reason of these
patterns has to be found in the labour supply dynamics determined by each reform.
The 2003 reform produces greater incentives for participation and full-time jobs
in the low and middle deciles. This reinforces the reduction in inequality.
After the 2005 module, we observe more increments in both participation and
part-time jobs for the middle deciles; this contrasts with the rise in the Gini index
due to the lower redistribution properties of the income tax.
Finally, the 2007 reform slightly reduces participation and part-time incentives
for the middle deciles. However, the behavioural Gini index is marginally lower
when behaviour is accounted for. A possible explanation could be found both in
the reduction of part-time jobs and in the lower participation rate of women in
couples. This could imply an increased homogeneity in the middle part of the
income distribution that is captured by the Gini index.
The combination of income eﬀects, homogeneity in the central section of the
income distribution and pure redistributive eﬀects explain why the static Gini
index is not significantly diﬀerent from the behavioural one for this reform.
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4.5. Concluding Remarks
The simulation of distributive and eﬃciency eﬀects of “real” reforms, when com-
pared with the results that could be obtained working on hypothetical systemic
reforms, inevitably tends to produce small changes, in particular when revenue
losses are not particularly strong.
In order to make them politically acceptable, periodic adjustments to the real
tax-benefit system are designed also so as to reduce the possibility that many
households may lose from them. Our results actually show small changes both in
the inequality measure and in labour supply, but can signal important aspects of
the reforms that have been already implemented, and that have, for the simple
reason of having actually taken place, a special importance in themselves.
More than on the magnitude of the behavioural changes, attention should focus
on the sign of their direction. The two centre-right modules had a total cost of
about 13 billion euros, with very small distributive impacts, while the subsequent
reform by the centre-left government produced a greater amount of redistribution,
since it actually increased the tax burden for high incomes, with no revenue loss.
From a distributive point of view, therefore, the diﬀerence between the two
approaches is clear, although in all cases the changes in the Gini index have been
quite modest. The adjustment in the tax structure with the most significant
consequences in terms of labour supply incentives is the extension of the no-tax
area in 2003. This reform produced an increase in female labour supply for low
and middle deciles. As a consequence, the behavioural reactions to this reform
increased real incomes at the bottom of the distribution, therefore further reducing
the Gini index. This eﬀect could not be observed using a static tax-benefit model
(see fig. 1, where the eﬀect on the first decile of the 2003 reform is negligible). The
2003 module, therefore, produced both a reduction in inequality and an increase
in labour supply. In this case, we do not observe a trade-oﬀ, but complementarity,
between equity and eﬃciency.
The 2005 module, the most apparent step towards the flat rate model, increased
inequality but had a (smaller) additional positive impact on labour supply, that
slightly reduced the tendency for inequality to rise. Interestingly, the behavioural
contribution that in part counterbalanced the rise in inequality comes from the
lower deciles since the behavioural impact of this reform in the top deciles is
absolutely negligible. Indeed, husbands in the top decile reduced their labour
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supply while their wives slightly increased participation. The overall eﬀect is
almost zero. However, in the middle decile we observe increments in participation
for both wives and husbands.
The 2007 reform, finally, has had a clear equity eﬀect, further reducing inequal-
ity, but with a reduction in eﬃciency, particularly among low-income women. This
could derive from the expansion of cash transfers, that are decreasing with fam-
ily income and therefore produce both an income and a substitution eﬀect on
the choice between leisure and consumption, in particular for women in couples
with children. The 2007 reform actually presents the traditional trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency and equality since it concentrates more public funds towards low and
middle-income households, that have a relatively elastic labour supply. However,
it is more and more diﬃcult for reforms that come later to further improve on
both the distributional and incentive eﬀects produced by previous modifications
of the tax-benefit system, in particular when the various reforms attempt to share
the same broad aims, e.g. reducing inequality and/or increasing participation.
Actually, the 2007 reform preserves most of the improvements contained in the
past reform as the 2005 reform did with respect to the previous one. Hence, com-
paring the final structure of the income tax with that of the baseline year, several
steps forward emerge. Overall work incentives have improved for both women and
men in couples, without reducing the redistributive eﬀect of the personal income
tax.
The broad lesson that the experience of these three reforms leaves is that it is
possible to adjust the structure of the Italian tax-benefit system so as to improve
both equity and eﬃciency. If we want to make further steps in this direction, it
would be advisable to reduce marginal tax rates on low incomes, providing positive
eﬀects in terms of both income distribution and labour supply, while child benefits
should not be made too rapidly decreasing with the level of family income.
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5.1. Introduction
As we have seen in the previous two chapters, structural discrete choice mod-
els of labour supply are a useful tool for the ex-ante evaluation of labour supply
reactions to tax reforms. The underlying theoretical model draws from a neoclas-
sical environment, with optimising agents and random utility functions defined
over a discrete leisure-consumption space. Both the categorisation of the leisure-
consumption space and the assumption of random utilities create a typical discrete
choice setting, which allows handling highly non-convex budget sets and the non-
participation choice easily.
Modelling labour supply responses using a discrete approach has become increas-
ingly popular in recent years1. The main idea is to simulate real consumption over
a finite set of alternatives of leisure given the actual tax-benefit system. Then,
under the hypothesis that agents choose the combination of leisure and consump-
tion that maximises their random utility given the observed tax-benefit rules, the
probability of the observed choice can be recovered once a (convenient) assumption
on the utility stochastic term is made2.
As for the rule of unobserved preference heterogeneity in the labour supply
literature, this has mainly been considered in a parametric way by assuming that
unobserved taste variability has a specific – typically continuous – distribution,
which can be then integrated out from the likelihood during the estimation process.
Recently, unobserved heterogeneity has been estimated nonparametrically using a
latent class approach á la Heckman and Singer (1984). The idea is to assume a
discrete distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity and to estimate the mass
points and the population shares along with the other parameters of the utility
function3.
However, regardless of the approach used, unobserved heterogeneity has always
been assumed to aﬀect only a relatively small set of parameters, in particular
those that mainly define the marginal utility of consumption and/or the marginal
utility of leisure. The reason for this simplification does not rest on a specific
1Earlier works that explore this method are those from Van Soest (1995), Keane and Moﬃtt (1998)
and Blundell et al. (2000). See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a review of alternative approaches
for labour supply models.
2Hence, what is estimated within this framework are the parameters of the direct utility function and
not of typical labour supply Marshallian functions.
3Recent examples are from Haan (2006), Haan and Uhlendorﬀ (2007), Wrohlich (2005), Bargain (2007)
and Vermeulen et al. (2006).
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economic theory but on the computational problems that normally arise with
gradient-based maximisation algorithms as Newton-Raphson or BHHH. Indeed,
labour supply models contain a relatively high set of parameters so as to better
explain how labour supply behaviour relates to the tax system. Moreover, the
presence of random coeﬃcients significantly changes the shape of the likelihood
function, increasing its complexity and slowing down the search algorithm.
Hence, it follows that the higher the number of parameters specified as random,
the more diﬃcult and slower the numerical computation of the gradient. This
implies, in turn, a more unstable Hessian with the related probability of empirical
singularity at some iterations. For this reason, the number of random parameters
in labour supply models has always been small, which might curtails the role of
unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, depending on the size of unobserved heterogene-
ity and on the number of coeﬃcients specified as random, post-estimation results -
as elasticities or other measures - may not diﬀer significantly from those obtained
without accounting for unobserved taste heterogeneity.
Haan (2006) proves that no matter the way the researcher accounts for unob-
served heterogeneity - parametrically or nonparametrically with just a few ran-
dom parameters - the subsequent labour supply elasticities do not change signifi-
cantly with respect to the base model without unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover,
Colombino and Locatelli (2008) compare the results of a hypothetical tax reform
when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced parametrically in three coeﬃcients
and find very small diﬀerences in the evaluation of the reform. This paper confirms
these previous findings although shows that a complete stochastic specification -
with all the coeﬃcients specified as random - not only improves the results in terms
of fitting but also leads to highly significant diﬀerences in the subsequent labour
supply elasticities. This finding is particularly important for the applied research
whose aim is to evaluate the labour supply reaction to tax reforms empirically. In-
deed, diﬀerent elasticities of labour supply imply diﬀerent policy recommendations
and diﬀerent judgements about the reform under analysis.
In order to estimate a fully random specification, we bypass the computa-
tional diﬃculties of gradient-based maximisation methods by developing a new
Expectation-Maximisation (EM) algorithm for the nonparametric estimation of
mixing distributions that is quickly implementable, ensures convergence and speeds-
up the estimation process.
Our empirical analysis is based on the European panel of Income and Living
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Conditions (EU-SILC) and is carried out in two steps. Firstly, we estimate labour
supply elasticities using diﬀerent specifications of unobserved taste heterogeneity
and show that they can diﬀer significantly depending on the way in which unob-
served heterogeneity is specified. Secondly, we simulate a real tax reform - the
introduction of a working tax-credit scheme in the Italian tax-benefit system - in
order to show how diﬀerent labour supply elasticities can lead to diﬀerent results
in terms of labour supply reactions and post-reform income distribution.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 1 we present the basic discrete
choice model of labour supply. Section 2 shows how unobserved heterogeneity has
been considered in the literature. Section 3 presents an overview of the EM al-
gorithm. Section 4 comments on the estimated utility parameters and compares
elasticities across various specifications of our model. Section 5 contains the sim-
ulation and the evaluation of the introduction of a UK-style working tax-credit
schedule for Italy. Section 6 concludes.
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5.2. The basic econometric model without unobserved
heterogeneity
In this section we develop the econometric framework for the basic structural
labour supply model. Here we propose a simplified version of the basic model
outlined in chapter three. In particular, we focus only on married/de facto couples
and do not consider singles. Furthermore, we follow a unitary framework in order
to model the household’s decision process and assume that each household has a
limited set of work alternatives. Spouses choose simultaneously the combination
that maximises a joint random utility function, which is defined over the household
disposable income and the hours of work of either spouse. Since the household
utility is subject to a random disturbance, it is possible to recover the probability
of the observed choice once an assumption on the distribution of the stochastic
component is made.
In what follows, the basic model outlined in chapter three is reproposed and
adapted in order to set the notation for the purposes of this chapter. In particular,
let Hj = [hfj ;hmj] be a vector of worked hours for alternative j , hf for women
and hm for men. Let yij be the net household income associated with combination
j and Xi be a vector of individual and household characteristics. Then the utility
of household i when H =Hj is:
Uij = U(yij, Hj, Xi) + ξij (5.1)
Where ξij is a choice-specific stochastic component which is assumed to be inde-
pendent across the alternatives and to follow a type-one extreme value distribution.
The net-household income of household i when alternative j is chosen is defined
as follows:
yij = wifhfj + wimhmj + nlyi + TB(wif ; wim; Hj; nlyi; Xi) (5.2)
Where wif and wim are the hourly gross wages from employment for women and
men respectively; nlyi is the household non-labour income and the function TB(.)
represents the tax-benefit system.
For those people who are not observed working, gross wage rates are estimated
according to the standard selection model outlined in chapter three. However, in
this chapter we do not allow for errors in the prediction of wages for non-workers in
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order to keep the model as simple as possible. For this reason, we use the estimated
wages for everyone, not only for those observed out of the labour market4.
Following the specification introduced in chapter three, the observed part of the
utility in eq.1 is defined as a second order polynomial with interactions between
the wife and the husband terms:
U(yij;Hj;Xi) = α1y2ij + α2hf
2
j + α3hm
2
j+
+α4hfjhmj + α5yijhfj + α6yijhmj+
+β1yij + β2hfj + β3hmj
(5.3)
In order to introduce individual characteristics in the utility function, the coeﬃ-
cients of the linear terms are defined as follows:
βj =
Kj￿
i=1
βijxij j￿{1, 2, 3} (5.4)
Under the assumption that the couple maximises her utility and that the utility
stochastic terms in each alternative are independent and identically distributed
with a type-one extreme value distribution, the probability of choosing Hj =
[hfj ;hmj] is given by5:
Pr(H =Hj|Xi) = Pr[Uij > Uis,∀s ￿= j]
=
exp(U(yij, Hj, Xi))￿K
k=1 exp(U(yik, Hk, Xi))
(5.5)
Then, the log likelihood function for the basic model is:
LL =
N￿
i=1
log
J￿
j=1
(Pr(H =Hj |Xi))dij (5.6)
4It is worth noting that this is necessary in order to avoid biased simulation results. Indeed, us-
ing predicted wages only for non-workers without controlling for errors in the prediction, creates a
distribution of wages for this sub-sample that would be too concentrated on the mean (expected)
value. This, of course, has a strong impact on the subsequent variance of the simulated net-income
alternatives and, in turns, on the estimation results.
If predicted wages are used for the whole population, instead, both workers and non-workers have
an estimated hourly productivity level that is computed according to the same wage generating
process, which allows for a more consistent analysis and for more comparable results across diﬀerent
sub-groups of the whole population.
5See McFadden (1973)
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Where dij is a dummy variable that equals to one for the observed choice and zero
otherwise.
The econometric model described above is a typical conditional logit model,
which can be estimated by means of high-level statistical software packages. How-
ever, the drawbacks of this basic model are well known in the literature. As
pointed out in Bhat (2000) there are three main assumptions which underline the
standard conditional logit specification. The first one assumes that the stochas-
tic components of the utility function are independent across alternatives. The
second assumption is that unobserved individual characteristics do not aﬀect the
response to variations in observed attributes. Finally, the assumption of error
variance-covariance homogeneity implies that the extent of substitutability among
alternatives is the same across individuals.
One prominent eﬀect of these assumptions is the well-known property of inde-
pendence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) at an individual level, which can be
very restrictive in our labour supply framework6.
The next section introduces diﬀerent models that have been used in the labour
supply literature in order to reduce the extent of the IIA property by relaxing one
or more of the assumptions listed above.
6Consider a choice set initially defined by just two alternatives: working full time and not working.
The IIA assumption implies that introducing another alternative - say a part-time alternative - does
not change the relative odds between the two initial choices.
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5.3. Modelling unobserved heterogeneity in preferences
The literature has developed several models that relax the IIA property of the
multinomial conditional logit. Parametric random coeﬃcients mixed models are
probably the most important among numerous innovations because of their overall
flexibility7. The idea that underlies these specifications is that agents have diﬀerent
unobserved tastes that aﬀect individual response to given attributes. In other
words, the parameters that enter the utility are not fixed across the population
- like in traditional multinomial logit models - but vary randomly with a given
unknown distribution. In empirical works, the analyst makes an assumption on
the distribution of this unobserved variability and the moments of this distribution
are then estimated along with the other preference parameters. Clearly, there is
a great freedom in the choice of diﬀerent densities and many alternatives can be
tested8.
However, any parametric specification has several drawbacks implied by its in-
trinsic characteristics. As Train (2008) points out, using a normal density, which
has a support on both sides of zero, could be problematic when the unobserved
taste is expected to be signed for some economic reasons (such the marginal utility
of consumption). Other alternatives that avoid this problem, like the log-normal
or the triangular distribution, have their own drawbacks in applied research.
Another problem of these mixed models is simply practical. Indeed, since the an-
alyst does not observe the individual tastes completely, the conditional probability
of the observed choice has to be integrated over all possible values of the unob-
served taste. Depending on the number of parameters assumed to be random, this
could imply the construction of a multi-dimensional integral that becomes diﬃ-
cult to compute, even with simulation methods. For this reason, many researchers
choose to reduce the number of random parameters so as to keep the estimation
feasible, and this particularly true in the labour supply literature where the number
of parameters to be estimated could be relatively high.
More formal, it is convenient to rewrite the direct utility function of equation 3
in a matrix form. In particular, let the utility of choice j for agent i be:
U(yij,Hj,Xi) =W
￿
ijα+G
￿
ijβ + ξij (5.7)
7See McFadden and Train (2000).
8Common choices are the Gaussian, the log-normal or the triangular distribution.
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WithW ij = (y2ij, hf 2j , hm2j , hfhmj, yijhfj, yijhmj)￿;Gij = (yij, hfj, hmj)￿ and α
and β being the subsequent vectors of coeﬃcients as in equation 3. Following the
recent labour supply literature, assume now the set of parameters in vector β to
be random:
βi = β +ΘX i +Ωϑi E(ϑi) = 0, Cov(ϑi) = Σ (5.8)
WithX i defined as the matrix of observed individual and household characteristics
that aﬀect the vector of means β, Θ the corresponding coeﬃcient matrix, ϑi a
vector of iid unobserved individual taste shifters, Ω the Cholesky factor of the
Variance-Covariance Matrix Σ to be estimated along with the other structural
parameters. Since ϑi is not observed, the probability of the observed choice has to
be integrated over its distribution. If we now let φ(ϑi) be the multivariate density
of the random vector ϑi, the unconditional probability of choice j for household i
can be now written as:
Pr(Hi =Hij |Xi) =
ˆ
Pr(Hi =Hi,j |Xi,ϑi)φ(ϑi)dϑi (5.9)
Where Pr(Hi = Hij |Xi,ϑi) is the conditional logit probability of choice j as
defined in equation 5. Since this multidimensional integral cannot be solved nu-
merically, Train (2003) suggests simulation methods with Halton sequences. The
simulated-log likelihood for the sample is then:
LL =
N￿
i=1
log
1
R
R￿
r=1
J￿
j=1
[Pr(Hi = Hij |Xi,ϑir)]dij (5.10)
Where the integrals are approximated by the empirical expectation over the R
draws from the selected multivariate distribution of the unobserved tastes.
The literature has recently suggested latent class logit models as a variant of the
standard multinomial logit that resembles the random coeﬃcients mixed model
described above. Latent class models can account for unobserved heterogeneity
nonparametrically and have been proposed so as not to be constrained by distri-
butional assumptions. These models were developed theoretically in the eighties
by Heckman and Singer (1984) and have received great attention in the area of
models for count. First applications of this method to discrete choices models are
those in Swait (1994) and Bhat (1997).
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The idea behind these models is that agents are sorted in a given number of
classes and that agents who are in diﬀerent classes have diﬀerent preference pa-
rameters and hence diﬀerent responses to given attributes. The analyst does not
observe the class membership and needs to model the probability of class mem-
bership along with the probability of the observed choice.
Let us assume that there are C latent classes in the population of interest. As
for the previous mixed model, we follow the recent labour supply literature and
assume that only the preference parameters in vector β of equation 7 diﬀer among
people in diﬀerent classes. Later, we will generalise our model and assume that
the whole set of taste parameters diﬀers among classes. The conditional logit
probability that household i belonging to class c chooses alternative j is:
Pr(Hi =Hij |Xi,βc) =
exp(W
￿
ijα+G
￿
ijβc)￿K
k=1 exp(W
￿
ikα+G
￿
ikβc)
(5.11)
Since class membership is not observed, the analyst has also to model the prob-
ability for each household to belong from each latent class. Following the latent
class literature, we adopt a multinomial logit formula in order to keep these un-
conditional probabilities in their right range and to ensure that they sum up to
one for every household9:
Pr(classi = c |∆i) = exp(∆
￿
iγc)￿C
c=1 exp(∆
￿
iγc)
c = 1, 2, ..., C ; γC = 0 (5.12)
Where γc is a vector of unknown class parameters that specifies the contribu-
tion of the observed individual characteristics contained in the matrix ∆i to the
probability of latent class membership10.
AsRoeder et al. (1999) point out, the variables in matrix ∆i, which are tradi-
tionally called risk factors , have to be specified properly. Nevertheless, in many
applications, and in particular those related to the labour supply literature, they
normally collapse to just a simple scalar in order to simplify the analysis and to
speed-up estimation.
Given equations 11 and 12, the conditional probability that a randomly selected
9See Greene (2001).
10The Cth vector of parameters is normalised to zero to ensure identification.
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household i chooses alternative j is:
C￿
c=1
Pr(classi = c |∆i)Pr(Hi =Hij |Xi,βc) (5.13)
Hence, the likelihood for the whole sample is:
LL =
N￿
i=1
log
C￿
c=1
Pr(classi = c |∆i)
J￿
j=1
[Pr(Hi =Hij |Xi,βc)]dij (5.14)
As Train (2008) points out, diﬀerently from parametric random coeﬃcients mixed
models, the primary diﬃculty with this nonparametric approach is computational
rather than conceptual since standard gradient-based algorithms for maximum
likelihood estimation become increasingly diﬃcult when the number of latent
classes rises.
Importantly, these empirical diﬃculties, which closely resembles those encoun-
tered in the parametric mixed model described above, explain why labour supply
analysts significantly constrain the number of latent classes, the number of risk
factors and the number of parameters that can diﬀer in each class11.
To summarise, the two mixed models outlined so far share a similar compu-
tational problem, which largely depends on the algorithms that are traditionally
used for the estimation of such models.
Mainly due to these diﬃculties, the role of unobserved heterogeneity in the
labour supply literature has always been limited and this could partially justify
Haan’s claim, who has not found significant diﬀerences in the labour supply elas-
ticities obtained when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced parametrically or
nonparametrically. We indeed confirm Haan’s findings in our empirical analysis
although we show that when unobserved heterogeneity is considered in a more
comprehensive way, the subsequent labour supply elasticities do change signifi-
cantly.
Precisely, our intuition is to develop a new estimation method that is not com-
pletely based on a standard gradient-based optimisation process so that the compu-
tational diﬃculties outlined in this section can be avoided. In particular, following
11Interestingly, as we have seen with the two mixed models, the set of parameters that are traditionally
assumed to be random in the labour supply literature (i.e. the parameters in vector β, according
to our specification) are the same whether the analysis is carried out parametrically with continuous
random coeﬃcients mixed logit models or nonparametrically with latent class models.
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Train (2008), we propose an EM algorithm for the nonparametric estimation of
mixing distributions that, given its overall stability, does ensure convergence and
speeds-up the computational process. Therefore, we can explore the role of un-
observed heterogeneity in a very general way since we are constrained neither to
distributional assumptions nor to computational diﬃculties.
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5.4. An EM recursion for discrete choice models of labour
supply
EM algorithms were initially introduced to deal with missing data problems,
although they turned out to be a very good method of estimating latent class
models where the missing data is the class shares12. Nowadays, they are widely
used in many economic fields where the assumption that people can be grouped in
classes with diﬀerent unobserved taste heterogeneity is reasonable. Hence, many
applications of this recursion can be found in health economics or consumer-choice
modelling but, as long as we know, there is no evidence for labour supply models.
From an econometric point of view, the attractiveness of this estimation method
lies in its overall stability. Moreover, Train (2008) has shown how EM algorithms
can be used for the nonparametric estimation of mixing distributions.
The recursion is known as “E-M” because it consists of two steps, namely an
“Expectation” and a "Maximisation”. As well explained in Train (2008), the term
being maximised is the expectation of the joint log-likelihood of the observed
and missing data, where this expectation is over the distribution of the missing
data conditional on the density of the observed data and the previous parame-
ters estimates. Consider the latent class model outlined in the previous section.
Traditionally, the log-likelihood in eq.14 is maximised by standard gradient-based
methods as Newton Raphson or BHHH. However, it can be shown that the same
log-likelihood can be maximised by repeatedly updating the following recursion:
ηs+1 = argmaxη
￿
i
￿
cCi(η
s)lnwic(γc)
￿
j [P (Hij|Xi,πc)]dij
= argmaxη
￿
i
￿
cCi(η
s)ln(Li | classi = c) (5.15)
Where πc = (βc ; αc)￿, η = (πc; wc; γc, c = 1, 2, .., C), wic(γc) is the uncon-
ditional density of the missing data computed as in eq. 5.12, Li is the joint
likelihood of both the observed choice and the missing data and C(ηs) is the pos-
terior probability that household i belongs to class c, conditional on the density
of the observed choice and the previous value of the parameters. This conditional
probability, C(ηs), is the key future of the EM recursion and can be computed by
12Our EM recursion is partially based on the algorithm developed in Train (2008). The routine is coded
in Stata® and is freely available in Pacifico (2009).
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means of Bayes’ theorem:
Ci(η
s) =
Li|classi = c￿C
c=1 Li|classi = c
(5.16)
Now, given that:
lnwc(γc)P (Hij|Xi,πc) = lnwc(γc) + ln P (Hij|Xi,πc) (5.17)
the recursion in eq. 5.15 can be split into diﬀerent steps:
1. Form the contribution to the likelihood (Li | classi = c) as defined in eq. 5.14
for each class13,
2. Form the individual-specific posterior probabilities of class membership using
eq. 5.16,
3. For each class, maximise the weighted log-likelihood so as to get a new set
of πc, c = 1, ..., C:
πs+1c = argmaxπ
￿
i
C(ηs)ln
￿
j
[P (Hij|Xi,πc)]dij (5.18)
4. Following eq. 5.17, maximise the other part of the log-likelihood in eq. 5.14
and get a new set of wc, c = 1, ..., C:
ws+1ic = argmaxw
N￿
i=1
C￿
c=1
Ci(η
s)lnwic(γc) (5.19)
• In particular, compute the new parameters that specify the impact of
the risk factors as:
γs+1 = argmaxγ
N￿
i=1
C￿
c=1
Ci(η
s)ln
exp(∆
￿
iγc)￿
c exp(∆
￿
iγc)
, γC = 0 (5.20)
13For the first iteration, starting values have to be used for the densities that enter the model. Impor-
tantly, these starting values must be diﬀerent in every class otherwise the recursion estimates the
same set of parameters for all the latent classes.
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• and update wic(γc) , c = 1, ..., C as:
ws+1ic =
exp(∆
￿
iγˆ
s+1
c )￿
c exp(∆
￿
iγˆ
s+1
c )
, c = 1, 2, ..., C ; γC = 0 (5.21)
5. Once πsc , γs and wsc have been updated to iteration s+1 , the posterior proba-
bility of class membership C(ηs+1) can also be recomputed and the recursion
can start again from point 3 until convergence14.
It is worth noting that in each maximisation, the posterior probability of class
membership enters the log-likelihood without unknown parameters to be estimated
and can be seen as an individual weight. Hence, eq.18 defines a typical conditional
logit model with weighed observations that can be estimated easily with respect
to the maximisation of the whole model as in eq. 5.14.
Importantly, the EM algorithm has been proved to be very stable and, under
conditions given by Dempster et al. (1977) and Wu (1983), this recursion always
climbs uphill until convergence to a local maximum15.
With this model in hand, it is possible to estimate a full latent class model of
labour supply without being conditioned neither to the number of parameters as-
sumed to be random nor to the number of latent classes. Moreover, the estimation
time drops significantly with respect to the time spent by standard gradient-based
algorithms used for the estimation of the other models16.
14Train (2008)does not use demographics for the class shares. In this case point 4 is replaced with:
ws+1c =
P
i Ci(η
s+1)P
i
P
c Ci(η
s+1)
, c = 1, ..., C (5.22)
Where Ci(ηs+1) is computed using the updated values of πc (from point 3) and the previous values
of the class shares.
15Clearly, it is always advisable to check whether the local maximum is also global by using diﬀerent
starting values.
16Both the continuous random coeﬃcient mixed logit models and the latent class model á la Heckman
and Singer (1984) are very time consuming. With about 30 parameters and 4000 observations, the
Stata® routines take about 6 hours to get convergence with our Intel quad-core PC with 4GBs of
RAM (and STATA 10.1 MP); instead, our EM recursion takes less than 1 hour to get convergence
for a model with 4 latent classes and 115 parameters.
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5.5. Empirical findings
For our empirical analysis we use the 2006 Italian wave of the European Union
panel on Income and Living Conditions. We focus on the main category of tax-
payer, i.e. households of employed, and allow for a flexible labour supply for both
spouses. Drawing on previous literature, all couples in which either spouse is elder
than 65, self-employed, student, retired or serving in the army are excluded.
The sample selection leads to about 4000 households, which are representative
of almost 60% of Italian tax-payers. The number of working hours of both women
and men is categorised according to their empirical distributions. In particular, we
define 6 categories of hours for women (no work, 3 part-time options and 2 full-time
alternatives) and 3 for men (no work, full-time and overwork), which implies 18
diﬀerent combinations for each household17. The disposable net household income
for each alternative is derived on the basis of a highly detailed tax-benefit simulator
- MAPP06 - developed at the Centre for the Analysis of Public Policies (CAPP)18.
In what follows, we first consider the three models introduced in sections 1 and 2.
The first model is estimated without accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and
is then a typical multinomial conditional logit (MNL), as we explained in section
1.
The second model is by far the most common in the applied labour supply
literature and it is normally referred to as the continuous random coeﬃcients
mixed logit (RCML), which allows for unobserved heterogeneity using a parametric
assumption for its distribution. In particular, following the traditional labour
supply modelling, we allow the three coeﬃcients of the linear terms of the utility
to be random with independent normal densities19. We then estimate the means
and the standard deviations of these coeﬃcients along with the other preference
parameters using Simulated Maximum Likelihood20.
The third model we present is the nonparametric version of the previous one,
meaning that we allow the same subset of coeﬃcients to be random and estimate
them using a latent class specification. This manner of accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity is becoming widespread and is commonly defined as a nonparamet-
17The categories for women are: 0, 13, 22, 30, 36 and 42 weekly hours of work. For men we define 3
categories: 0, 43 and 50 weekly hours of work.
18See Baldini and Ciani (2009).
19The estimation with correlated normal densities did not improve the likelihood and the estimated
correlation coeﬃcients were not significant.
20See Train (2003).
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ric estimation of mixed logit models á la Heckman-Singer (HSML). The model is
estimated via Maximum Likelihood and for each random parameter we estimate
its mass points and its population shares. As in any latent class analysis, a pri-
mary goal is the definition of the proper number of latent classes. However, as we
explained in section 2, due to the computational diﬃculties related to standard
optimisation methods, labour supply analysts tend to specify a very small number
of latent classes and do not include covariates in the set of risk factors. We then
follow this standard specification and estimate a model with just 2 latent classes
and only a constant in the set of variables that enter the probability of class mem-
bership21.The next table shows the estimated parameters for these three models,
along with the maximised log-likelihood:
21Actually, we tried to estimate more sophisticated versions of the HSML model. In particular, we tried
to rise the number of latent classes and to allow for covariates in the set of risk factors. Nevertheless,
the estimation of any of these versions via maximum likelihood did not achieve convergence.
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Table 3.1: Estimated utility parameters (1)
MNL RCML HSML
Coeﬀ z Coeﬀ z Coeﬀ z
α1: Constant -30.04 -7.36 -36.64 -7.81 -35.54 -7.72
α2: Constant -0.08 -2.80 -0.09 -2.96 -0.09 -2.93
α3: Constant -0.22 -13.94 -0.36 -8.26 -0.31 -11.00
α4: Constant -2.02 -7.48 -2.18 -7.05 -2.36 -6.92
α5: Constant 2.38 6.14 2.76 6.31 2.65 6.15
α6: Constant 2.49 5.97 2.86 5.51 2.67 5.39
β1: Constant 50.98 19.56 61.67 17.85 - -
Wife’s age 0.81 1.12 2.14 1.85 1.56 1.86
Husband’s age -2.01 -3.15 -1.92 -2.88 -1.97 -2.87
Youngest child 0-6 -7.17 -3.00 -8.12 -3.08 -9.18 -3.51
σ1 - - 0.06 3.01 -
β2: Constant -0.58 -2.75 -0.89 -3.96 - -
Wife’s age 0.06 0.48 0.0003 0.02 0.04 0.34
Wife’s age^2 -0.03 -2.46 -0.04 -2.62 -0.04 -2.76
Wife’s education -0.21 -6.91 -0.3 -8.47 -0.30 -8.54
Southern Italy -0.19 -7.29 -0.18 -6.92 -0.19 -7.10
Youngest child 0-6 0.2 2.05 0.25 2.27 0.29 2.65
Numb. of children -0.16 -5.36 -0.16 -5.21 -0.16 -5.16
σ2 - - 0.02 1.82 - -
β3: Constant -1.3 -8.23 -0.59 -1.90 - -
Husband’s age 0.05 0.39 0.55 2.05 0.62 2.49
Husband’s age^2 -0.01 -1.04 -0.09 -2.83 -0.09 -3.27
Husband’s educ. -0.13 -3.72 -0.06 -1.05 -0.08 -1.70
Southern Italy -0.08 -2.63 -0.23 -3.68 -0.23 -4.41
Youngest child 0-6 0.24 2.10 0.27 2.00 0.32 2.48
σ3 - - 0.75 6.12 - -
1(husb=0 ho.): Constant -3.14 -10.07 -3.67 -10.81 -3.53 -10.64
1(wife=0 ho.): Constant 3.72 14.40 3.79 14.62 3.80 14.65
β1:
β1:
Mass 1
Mass 2
59.5
63.31
13.4
17.11
β2:
β2:
Mass 1
Mass 2
-0.83
-0.80
-3.13
-3.45
β3:
β3:
Mass 1
Mass 2
-1.73
-0.70
-6.75
-2.61
prob (class1) 0.78 5.18
Log-Likelihood: -8069 -8050 -8043
Note: RCLM estimated by SML with 500 halton draws; the σs are the estimated standard
deviations. The logit probability of class 1 is estimated for the HS model, the standard error
reported in the table is computed using the “delta method”. 1(husb=0 ho.) and 1(wife=0
ho.) are dummy for the alternatives where the husband and the wife do not work.
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As the table shows, most coeﬃcients have the expected sign over the three
specifications22. Following Van Soest (1995), we computed the first and the second
derivative of the utility function with respect to income and spouses’ hours of work
in order to check if the empirical model is coherent with the economic theory.
Results show that the marginal utility of income increases at a decreasing rate for
all the households in the sample and this result holds over the three specifications23.
If we now observe the maximised log-likelihood, we can deduce that unobserved
heterogeneity is actually present in our sample. Both the models that account
for unobserved taste variability dominate the simple conditional logit model. In
particular, the standard deviations of the random terms in the RCML are signifi-
cantly diﬀerent from zero, meaning that there is a high dispersion in the utility of
income and (dis)utility of work due to unobserved tastes. Importantly, the same
conclusion can be derived from the HSML model where the probability of each la-
tent class and the various mass points are highly significant. Since the two models
are not nested, we use the Bayesian Information Criteria and conclude that the la-
tent class specification dominates the RCML model. This implies that unobserved
heterogeneity could be better considered in a nonparametric way.
These three diﬀerent specifications are what the literature has suggested so far.
As underlined before, the main problems with the RCML and the HSML are both
conceptual and computational. Thus, convergence and speediness are achieved
at the cost of reducing the role of unobserved heterogeneity so that only few
coeﬃcients are allowed to be random.
We now present the estimates for our fourth model, which generalises the HSML
model by defining a complete latent class mixed logit specification (LCML). For
the estimation of such a model, traditional gradient-based methods are still fea-
sible but, depending on the number of latent classes, they could be highly time-
consuming and could not guarantee convergences24. Hence, the LCML is estimated
throughout the EM recursion outlined in the previous section, which allows for a
great flexibility in the selection of the number of latent classes. FollowingGreene
22An economic interpretation of the various coeﬃcients is omitted here because this is not the aim of
this paper. However, Baldini and Pacifico (2009) discuss and analyse widely a similar model for the
Italian case.
23In the MLN, the marginal utility of work is negative for almost 75% of the women and for about 55%
of men. Similar results are found for the other two specifications.
24We tried to estimate this specification by ML. However, this was feasible only for the model with
two latent classes since no convergence was achieved for models with a higher number of classes.
Moreover, the estimation took more than 13 hours with the PC described in footnote 18.
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and Hensher (2003) and Train (2008), we adopt the Bayesian Information Criteria
for the selection of the right number of latent classes. As we can see from table 1
in the appendix, the appropriate number of latent classes according to the BIC is
four.
Another important issue that the EM algorithms enable us to consider properly
without computational constraints is the right specification of the “risk factors”
that enter the probability of belonging to a given class. In order to account for
as much information as possible in the definition of these variables, we performed
a principal-component factor analysis of the correlation matrix of a set of covari-
ates thought to be helpful for the explanation of class memberships. Table 2 in
the appendix shows the (rotated) factor loadings obtained with the varimax rota-
tion whose eigenvalues were higher than one25. Following Thompson and Daniel
(1996), the households’ risk factors that enter the probability model outlined above
are then computed by using the scoring coeﬃcients obtained through a standard
regression model.
The next table reports the coeﬃcients for the LCML model with four latent
classes along with their (weighted) average across the four classes26. As can be seen,
the maximised log-likelihood is significantly higher with respect to the other models
and also the fitting significantly increases27. Looking at the sign (and magnitude)
of the average coeﬃcients, we can see that the economic implications related to this
model are in line with those from the other specifications. Importantly, using the
estimated posterior probability of class membership, it is possible to disentangle
the type of households that are more representative in each class. In particular,
class 1 is mainly composed of households living in southern Italy, with young
children and with relatively young parents. Class 3, instead, is composed mainly
by the same type of households but living in northern Italy. Interestingly, these
households have, on average, a higher education then those in class 1 and are more
likely to own their house. Class 4, in comparison, mainly consists of relatively
older households, with less young children and with relatively worse parents’ health
conditions.
25As can be seen from the magnitude of the factor loadings, the first principal factor is linked to the
socio-demographic characteristics, the second and the third are related to the wife’s and the husband’s
health conditions respectively whilst the last captures the socio-economic status.
26Standard errors are estimated by nonparametric bootstrap. For the bootstrap exercise we used 50
bootstrap samples, each of them having the same size of the original sample.
27Table 3 in the appendix shows the predicted and actual frequencies for each alternative over our four
specifications.
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As for the analysis of preferences in each class, we computed the marginal
(dis)utility of income (work) in every class and evaluated the results using the
probabilities of class membership. Interestingly, on average, households that are
more likely to belong to class 1 and 3 have the lowest marginal utility of income,
which could be partially explained by the relatively young age of both parents.
Moreover, households with a highest probability to belong to class 1 - which are
mainly located in southern Italy - have a higher marginal disutility of work if
compared with the other classes28.
28Many other analysis about the characteristics of households in diﬀerent latent classes could be made
but we defer them to other - more applied - studies.
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Table 3.2: Estimated utility parameters (2)
lc. 1 z lc. 2 z lc. 3 z lc.4 z Aver. z
α1: Constant -65.9 -6.2 -86.5 -5.4 -10.9 -1.1 -19.6 -1.7 -38.5 -3.4
α2: Constant 1.5 8.0 -0.4 -3.8 -1.6 -16.6 -3.9 -16.6 -1.7 -2.0
α3: Constant -0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -1.3 -0.3 -7.8 -0.5 -11.5 -0.3 -4.0
α4: Constant -4.4 -7.0 -5.8 -6.0 0.4 0.5 -1.7 -2.6 -2.5 -3.3
α5: Constant 5.7 6.4 8.6 5.6 -1.1 -1.0 1.3 1.2 2.9 2.5
α6: Constant 5.4 5.1 5.6 3.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1 2.9 2.9
β1: Constant 55.5 9.6 130.6 10.3 42.9 7.3 116.6 15.5 89.4 3.1
Wife’s age -2.8 -2.1 25.7 7.4 -2.0 -1.4 -2.7 -1.2 2.3 1.4
Husband’s age -2.8 -1.9 -17.6 -5.6 1.1 0.6 -3.5 -2.8 -4.7 -4.4
Youngest child 0-6 0.5 0.1 6.8 0.7 -34.3 -6.5 15.4 1.8 -0.7 -0.1
β2: Constant -8.9 -7.9 -0.6 -0.8 5.7 10.6 25.9 14.3 9.6 1.9
Wife’s age -0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.6
Wife’s age^2 0.0 0.4 -0.2 -3.5 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.5 -0.1 -2.6
Wife’s education -0.3 -5.1 -0.8 -5.8 -0.2 -2.5 -0.8 -11.6 -0.6 -8.3
Southern Italy -0.3 -5.7 -1.1 -7.4 -0.2 -2.0 0.1 2.2 -0.2 -3.0
Youngest child 0-6 0.0 -0.2 -0.9 -2.1 1.9 7.3 -0.7 -2.2 0.0 0.0
Numb. of children 0.4 1.9 -2.4 -11.8 0.3 2.7 -0.4 -2.7 -0.4 -2.7
β3: Constant -2.8 -7.8 -4.3 -6.4 -0.6 -1.7 -1.6 -3.8 -2.1 -5.4
Husband’s age -1.2 -4.5 3.9 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.2 0.6 1.7
Husband’s age^2 0.2 5.3 -0.6 -6.9 0.0 -1.2 -0.1 -1.7 -0.1 -2.0
Husband’s educ. -0.2 -2.7 -0.6 -4.9 0.1 0.9 -0.6 -5.7 -0.4 -5.2
Southern Italy 0.0 -0.8 0.1 0.9 -0.2 -2.8 -0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -1.5
Youngest child 0-6 0.0 0.2 -1.3 -3.1 1.5 5.4 -0.7 -1.8 -0.1 -0.6
θ1: 1(hours husband=0) -6.4 -7.8 -5.7 -3.9 -1.8 -2.8 -0.8 -0.9 -3.0 -2.8
θ2: 1(hours wife=0) -5.1 -3.8 7.6 7.3 8.0 15.9 56.4 16.9 24.3 2.9
Contributions to class membership (base = class 1):
Constant - 0.2 3.23 0.45 7.53 0.99 17.9
Factor 1 - 0.6 10.4 0.88 15.4 1.08 20.5
Factor 2 - 0.07 1.29 0.05 1.03 0.06 1.22
Factor 3 - 0.21 3.71 0.16 3.01 0.12 2.5
Factor 4 - 0.7 11.9 1.01 17.4 0.74 14.4
Class probability (average) 0.21 3.41 0.17 1.90 0.23 7.73 0.39 4.91
Log-likelihood: -7691.49
Note: model estimated via EM algorithm. Convergence achieved after 150 iteration. Standard errors
computed using 50 bootstrapped samples
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We now turn to the main issue of this paper and compute the (average) elas-
ticities across the various specifications of our labour supply models. Following
Creedy and Kalb (2005), we computed such elasticities numerically. It is worth
noting that these elasticities have to be interpreted carefully because they can de-
pend substantially on the initial discrete hour level and the relative change in the
gross hourly wages. However, they are surely a useful measure of the labour sup-
ply behaviour implied in our estimated model and can be used to check whether
diﬀerent specifications lead to diﬀerent policy prescriptions29.
labour supply elasticities are computed for each spouse as follows. Firstly, gross
hourly wages are increased by 1% for either spouse and a new vector of net house-
hold income for each alternative is computed. Secondly, the probability of each
alternative is evaluated for both the old and the new vector of net household in-
come according to the various specifications of our model. Thereafter, the expected
labour supply can be computed for each household as:
E[Hs |Y sp ,Xi] =
Ks￿
k=1
Pr(Hsk |Y sp ,Xi) · hourssk
Where s=men, women and p=after, before. Finally, the labour supply elasticities
for either spouse are defined as:
εs =
E[Hs |Y safter,Xi]− E[Hs |Y sbefore,Xi]
E[Hs |Y sbefore,Xi]
· 1
0.01
In order to check whether diﬀerent specifications lead to diﬀerent labour sup-
ply elasticities, we adopt the same strategy as Haan (2006). More specifically,
we computed 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the MNL labour supply
elasticities and checked whether they diﬀer significantly from those obtained with
other specifications.
The next table shows the (average) own elasticities derived from 1% increase in
the gross hourly wages of either spouse. As can be observed, women’s elasticities
are higher than men’s elasticities. Female cross elasticities are not significantly
diﬀerent from zero whilst male cross elasticities are relatively higher and positive.
29Indeed, diﬀerent elasticities across the various specifications would imply diﬀerent labour supply re-
actions to tax reforms. This, in turns, implies diﬀerent results in terms of social welfare evaluation,
government expected expenditure/savings and expected changes in the post-reform distribution of
income.
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If we now look at the elasticities divided by socio-demographic characteristics,
we can see that elasticities are higher in the case of households in southern Italy
(which is the poorest part of the country) and for people with lower education.
Children reduce labour supply elasticities in particular if they are either many or
young.
These findings are common across the various specifications although the mag-
nitude is always slightly bigger for those models that account for unobserved het-
erogeneity. Importantly, the parametric random coeﬃcient mixed logit and the
latent class model with only few random coeﬃcients produce very similar results
in terms of estimated elasticities. Moreover, as found also in Haan (2006), these
elasticities always fall inside the 95% confidence interval for the elasticities derived
from the conditional logit model. However, if we now consider the elasticities pro-
duced with the LCML model, they are significantly higher and always fall outside
the confidence intervals constructed for the MNL specification, meaning that we
cannot reject the hypothesis of diﬀerent values.
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Table A3.3: Labour supply elasticities for married couples
Women: MNL RCML HSML LCML
All women .62
(.56 .67)
.64 .66 .89
from southern Italy .78
(.70 .85)
.82 .84 1.16
with high education .53
(.48 .59)
.55 .57 .76
without children .65
(.59 .72)
.70 .71 .99
with only one young child (<6) .55
(.47 .63)
.56 .57 .75
with only one young child (<15) .60
(.54 .66)
.62 .64 .85
with two young children (<15) .58
(0.51 .64)
.60 .61 .78
with three young children (<15) .52
(.44 .60)
.54 .56 .72
cross elasticities -.04
(-.09 .02)
-.07 -.09 -.15
Men: MNL RCML HSML LCML
All men .16
(.14 .18)
.17 .18 .28
southern Italy .27
(.23 .31)
.25 .28 .46
with high education .10
(.08 .13)
.11 .12 .19
without children .23
(.20 .27)
.23 .26 .34
with only one young child (<6) .13
(.10 .16)
.12 .12 .27
with only one young child (<15) .12
(.11 .14)
.13 .14 .24
with two young children (<15) .09
(.07 .12)
.10 .12 .23
with three young children (<15) .05
(.03 .07)
.06 .07 .13
cross elasticities .04
(.01 .07)
.06 .02 .10
Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence interval in parenthesis (1000
replications, percentile method).
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These findings are relevant in particular for the applied literature. Indeed, dis-
crete choice labour supply models have been estimated only using the RCML or
the HSML so far and the estimated coeﬃcients are then used to analyse the labour
supply behaviour after specific proposals of tax reforms. However, we have shown
that if unobserved heterogeneity is considered in a more comprehensive way, the
resulting elasticities might be significantly diﬀerent, which in turn may imply dif-
ferent conclusions in the subsequent welfare and distributive analysis, with the
probability of suggesting diﬀerent policy prescriptions related to a specific tax
reforms.
In order to prove this last claim, we evaluate a real structural reform of the Italian
tax-benefit system in the next section. In particular, we analyse the labour supply
reaction to the introduction of a UK-style working tax credit in the Italian tax-
benefit system and show that income distribution and labour supply implications
are significantly diﬀerent depending on the approach used.
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5.6. Simulating a WTC for Italy
The aim of working-tax credits is to encourage the participation of low income
households in the labour market. In particular, this in-work support is conditional
on either of the spouses in the family working at least h hours per week and
eligibility is based on gross household income. The maximum amount of this
benefit is defined according to a series of individual characteristics such as number
of young children, age, actual number of worked hours and presence of disability.
Normally, given eligibility and the maximum payable amount, the actual benefit
is a decreasing function of gross household income after a given income threshold.
Our simulation closely replicates the eligibility criteria and the main elements of
the UK WFTK30. In particular, our WTC is composed of five elements. A basic
element of €1000 for those people who are eligible; a “partner element” of €600
in case of married/de facto couple; a “+50” element of €100 if the person starts
working after a period of inactivity and he/she is over 50 years old; a “disability
element” whose amount depends on the level of certified disability (€400 for low
disability + €200 in case of high disability); a child element that depends on the
number and the age of children (for each child less than 3 years old the family
gets €600 and for children between 3 and 6 years old eligible families get €200
per child); a “+36 element” of €300 if the person works more than 36 hours per
week.
The maximum payable amount is given by the sum of these elements. Given
eligibility, the eﬀective amount paid depends on the gross household income. In
particular, according to the US version of the working tax credit - the EITC -
our benefit first increases until it reaches its maximum amount at the household
income threshold of€16000 and then it starts decreasing sharply until zero between
€16000 and €21000. As in the UK-version, eligibility depends on age, disability
level and number of worked hours per week. In particular, people younger than
25 years old who work at least 16 hours per week can get the benefit either if they
have young children or if they have a certified level of disability. Otherwise, only
people over 25 years who work for at least 30 hours are eligible. For married/de-
facto couples, the benefit is primarily computed on an individual basis and the
actual amount paid is the highest among the two spouses. In our simulation we
do not enforce tax neutrality and assume that the reform is financed through
30See www.direct.gov.uk for more details.
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new government expenditures. Grossing up our results for the selected sample of
households, we predict an increment of public spending of 2.8 billion of euro for
Italian married couples.
In what follows, we study the eﬀect of this tax reform on household labour
supply. Given the intrinsic probabilistic nature of our model, we aggregate the
(household) probability of choosing a particular alternative of working hours so
as to obtain individual frequencies for the main categories of working time. In
particular, for women, we aggregate the household probability so as to get the
individual frequencies of non-participation, part-time work (16-30) and full-time
work (>30). For men, we only distinguish between participation and full-time
work. The next table shows these aggregate frequencies before and after the reform
for each specification of our model.
As it can be seen, the sign of the labour supply reaction is the same in all four
specifications of our model. In particular, all models predict positive participation
incentives for married women whilst we observe a small participation disincentive
for men. Looking at the intensive margin, the highest incentive for those women
who would like to participate in the labour market is for full-time jobs, although
there are also positive incentive for part-time options.
If we now turn to the diﬀerences among the four models, it could be seen that
the MNL, the RCML and the HSML share a very similar labour supply pattern
after the reform. However, according to the elasticities computed in the previous
section, the labour supply reaction produced by the LCML model is significantly
stronger with respect to the other specifications.
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Table 3.4: Labour supply reaction to the WTC
Pre-reform Post-reform
LCML MNL RCML HSML
Women:
0 hours 50.85% 48.32% 49.80% 49.81% 49.69%
Part-time 19.37% 20.22% 19.68% 19.75% 19.75%
Full-time 29.78% 31.46% 30.52% 30.44% 30.56%
Tot 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Men:
0 hours 8.38% 9.12% 8.85% 8.88% 8.87%
Full-time 91.62% 90.88% 91.15% 91.12% 91.13%
Tot. 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note: Our computation based on the selected sample from EU-
SILC (2006)
In order to better understand the diﬀerences between the four models, the next
figures show, for each decile of gross household income, the absolute diﬀerence in
the average frequencies of each labour supply category before and after the reform.
As expected, mainly households in the lowest decile change their labour supply
behaviour. However, the overall pattern of labour incentives is quite diﬀerent if
we consider the LCML model with respect to the other three specifications, which
share a very similar pattern across the various decile.
If we focus on the latter specifications we can see that the participation rates of
married women increase the most for the second, third and fourth decile whilst the
part-time incentives are stronger and positive mainly for those women from the
middle class although negative for women in the first and second decile. Finally,
the full-time incentives are stronger for women in the first and second decile.
If we now consider the same work incentives using the LCML specification, we
observe first a significant diﬀerent magnitude and, second also a diﬀerent structure
of incentives across the various decile, in particular for the first two. To be precise,
the participation rates strongly increase for women in the first and second decile
whilst part-time incentives are always positive.
The participation rates for men decrease in the four models, although the LCML
model produces, again, a stronger reaction, in particular for low-income house-
holds.
109
5. On the role of unobserved preference heterogeneity in discrete choice models of labour supply
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-7%
-6%
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
LCML MNL HSML RCML
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Figure 4: variation in men participation rates  for 
decile of gross household income
In order to evaluate how the income distribution changes after the reform, we com-
pute the Gini index before and after the introduction of the WTC. As it can be
seen in the next table, the starting level of inequality is almost 32.3%. However,
after the reform, income inequality slightly reduces. However, the results for the
LCML are - again - stronger, implying a higher reduction in income inequality
(-1.2% versus an average of -0.84 over the other three specifications).
Table 3.5: Gini index before and after the reform
LCML MNL HSML RCML
Gini index before: 32.27% 32.27% 32.27% 32.27%
Gini index after: 31.06% 31.39% 31.47% 31.44%
￿ -1.21% -0.88% -0.80% -0.83%
Note: own computations based on EU-SILC 2006. For the com-
putation of the Gini index after the reform we used the “pseudo-
distribution” approach as in Creedy et al. (2006).
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The aim of this chapter has been twofold. First, we have shown that the way
researchers account for unobserved heterogeneity can have an impact on the de-
rived labour supply elasticities, which in turn implies that policy recommendations
related to given tax-reforms can change significantly according to the specification
of the model.
In particular, we have computed average elasticities for either spouses and proved
that these elasticities could diﬀer significantly depending on the way unobserved
heterogeneity is considered. Then, we simulated a structural tax reform by intro-
ducing a working tax credit schedule in the Italian tax-benefit system and shown
that policy implications, again, depend on the specification of unobserved hetero-
geneity.
Second, we have provided a relatively plain alternative to fully consider the
eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity nonparametrically. In particular, we have pro-
posed an easily-implementable EM algorithm that allows us to increase the number
of random coeﬃcients in the specification, ensure convergence and speed-up the
estimation process with respect to other standard gradient-based maximisation
algorithms.
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5.8. Appendix (1)
Table A3.1: Latent class models with diﬀerent number of classes
Latent Classes Log-Likelihood Parameters BIC
1 -8069.31 25 16138.62
2 -7859.82 55 15917.76
3 -7781.35 85 15868.88
4 -7691.49 115 15797.22
5 -7637.51 145 15797.32
Table A3.2: Rotated factor loadings
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Number of children <16 -0.70 0.06 -0.06 0.02
Youngest child 0-6 -0.77 0.04 -0.01 0.07
Southern Italy 0.00 0.16 -0.12 -0.45
Husband’s education -0.06 0.08 0.05 0.78
Wife’s education -0.19 0.08 0.04 0.78
House ownership 0.3 0.02 -0.03 0.45
Wife’s age 0.87 -0.09 -0.13 -0.04
Husband’s age 0.86 -0.08 -0.15 -0.09
Wife’s health status 0.22 -0.7 -0.26 -0.1
Husband’s health status 0.22 -0.23 -0.71 -0.12
Wife’s chronic diseases -0.02 0.8 0.03 -0.05
Husband’s chronic diseases -0.04 0.09 0.77 -0.09
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Table A3.3: Observed and predicted frequencies
Alternative
hours
women
hours
men
Observed LCLM MNL RCML HSML
1 0 0 5.76% 5.78% 5.76% 5.69% 5.73%
2 0 43 32.88% 32.88% 33.08% 33.22% 33.18%
3 0 50 12.21% 12.15% 12.01% 11.90% 11.95%
4 13 0 0.13% 0.11% 0.08% 0.07% 0.07%
5 13 43 2.44% 2.51% 3.25% 3.26% 3.26%
6 13 50 0.91% 1.03% 1.09% 1.09% 1.10%
7 22 0 0.38% 0.44% 0.25% 0.24% 0.24%
8 22 43 7.36% 6.97% 4.95% 4.96% 4.95%
9 22 50 2.34% 2.37% 1.66% 1.68% 1.68%
10 30 0 0.28% 0.29% 0.50% 0.51% 0.51%
11 30 43 3.88% 4.12% 6.74% 6.70% 6.69%
12 30 50 1.65% 1.40% 2.28% 2.30% 2.29%
13 36 0 0.76% 0.52% 0.74% 0.78% 0.77%
14 36 43 10.66% 10.68% 8.75% 8.71% 8.71%
15 36 50 2.23% 2.77% 2.89% 2.93% 2.91%
16 42 0 1.07% 1.19% 1.04% 1.10% 1.09%
17 42 43 10.87% 10.92% 11.31% 11.23% 11.25%
18 42 50 4.19% 3.86% 3.60% 3.64% 3.61%
Note: our computation based on the selected sample from EU-SILC (2006)
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5.9. Appendix (2)
The aim of this appendix is to show the practical implementation of the EM
algorithm for the estimation of the latent class model we proposed in the chapter.
Importantly, in what follows we allow for panel data, i.e. the agent is observed
making a given choice over a panel of T periods (the “choice situations”). We coded
the algorithm in Stata® 10.1 using a simple do file. Work has been in progress in
order to generalise the do file by writing a ado file. To start with, the log-likelihood
we want to maximise is the following:
LL =
N￿
i=1
log
C￿
c=1
Pr(classi = c |∆i)
T￿
t=1
J￿
j=1
[Pr(Hi =Hijt |Xijt,πc)]dijt (5.23)
Where c is the number of latent classes; dij is a dummy that selects the observed
choice;
Pr(classi = c |∆i) = exp(∆
￿
iγc)￿
c exp(∆
￿
iγc)
, c = 1, ..., C, γC = 0 (5.24)
is the unconditional probability of class membership, which may depend on a set
of demographics included in matrix ∆i, and
Pr(Hi =Hijt |Xijt,πc) =
exp(X
￿
ijtπc)￿K
k=1 exp(X
￿
iktπc)
(5.25)
is the probability that agent i chooses alternative j given that he/she belongs from
class c. This model has been traditionally estimated by maximum likelihood.
However, as we have seen in the main text, such estimation is often diﬃcult, in
particular if the number of parameters and the number of classes are high. For
these reasons, in the labour supply literature only a very small set of parameters
(one up to three) is assumed to be diﬀerent in each class. Moreover, the co-
variates that enter the probability of class membership often collapse to a simple
constant and the number of classes rarely are more than two. Obviously, these
constraints may aﬀect post-estimation results and do not actually provide a fully
non-parametric estimation method, as the number of classes is constrained by the
researcher to a very small number.
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An Em algorithm, thanks to its overall stability, may provide a better alternative
for a fully nonparametric estimation of this model without these computational
constraints. In particular, we have seen that the log-likelihood in equation 5.23
can be maximised by repeatedly updating the following recursion:
ηs+1 = argmaxη
￿
i
￿
cCi(η
s)lnwic(γc)
￿
t
￿
j [P (Hijt|Xijt,πc)]dijt
= argmaxη
￿
i
￿
cCi(η
s)ln(Li | classi = c) (5.26)
Where η = (πc; wc; γc, c = 1, 2, .., C); wic(γc) is the unconditional density of
class membership, which is computed as in equation 5.24; Li is the joint likelihood
of both the observed and missing data (that is, the class membership); C(ηs) is
the posterior probability that household i belongs to class c, conditional on the
density of the observed and missing data and the previous value of the parameters.
This conditional probability, C(ηs), is the key future of the EM recursion and can
be computed by means of Bayes’ theorem:
Ci(η
s) =
Li|classi = c￿C
c=1 Li|classi = c
(5.27)
Now, given the basic fact that:
lnwc(γc)P (Hijt|Xijt,πc) = lnwc(γc) + ln P (Hijt|Xijt,πc) (5.28)
the recursion in equation 5.26 can be split into diﬀerent steps:
1. Form the contribution to the likelihood (Li | classi = c) as defined in equation
5.23 for each class31,
2. Form the individual-specific posterior probabilities of class membership using
equation 5.27,
3. For each class, maximise the weighted log-likelihood so as to get a new set
of πc, c = 1, ..., C:
πs+1c = argmaxπ
￿
i
C(ηs)ln
￿
t
￿
j
[P (Hijt|Xijt,πc)]dijt (5.29)
31For the first iteration, starting values have to be used for the densities that enter the model. Impor-
tantly, these starting values must be diﬀerent in every class otherwise the recursion estimates the
same set of parameters for all the latent classes.
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4. Following equation 5.28, maximise the other part of the log-likelihood in
equation 5.26 and get a new set of wc, c = 1, ..., C:
ws+1ic = argmaxw
N￿
i=1
C￿
c=1
Ci(η
s)lnwic(γc) (5.30)
• In particular, compute the new parameters that specify the impact of
the risk factors as:
γs+1 = argmaxγ
N￿
i=1
C￿
c=1
Ci(η
s)ln
exp(∆
￿
iγc)￿
c exp(∆
￿
iγc)
, γC = 0 (5.31)
• and update wic(γc) , c = 1, ..., C as:
ws+1ic =
exp(∆
￿
iγˆ
s+1
c )￿
c exp(∆
￿
iγˆ
s+1
c )
, c = 1, 2, ..., C ; γC = 0 (5.32)
In what follows we show how to implement this algorithm in a Stata do file.
Importantly, it has to be borne in mind that the database is already organised
for the estimation of standard conditional multinomial logit models in Stata (i.e.
the command “CLOGIT ”), which means that each row corresponds to a particular
alternative for a given individual.
The first relevant point for the implementation of the EM algorithm is to define
the variables (the dependent variable “$depvar ”, which has to be constructed ac-
cording to the estimation of a standard CLOGIT model; the list of covariates that
enter the probability of the observed choice “$varlist”; the variable that ranks the
alternatives for each agent “$alt”; the variable that identifies the panel dimension,
i.e. the choice makers “$ind ”; the variable that defines the choice situations for
each choice maker “$idt”) and the environment (the number of classes “$nclasses”
and the number of iterations “$niter ”), and to provide Stata with the starting
values. In order to perform this latter task, we split the sample into C diﬀer-
ent sub-samples (one for each class) and estimate a separate CLOGIT for each
sub-sample. As for the starting values for the probability of class-membership
(equation 5.24) we simply define equal shares, that is 1C :
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********************************************
***define global variables and environment**
********************************************
global depvar "ch"
global varlist "introduce covariates here"
global alternative "alt"
global id "id"
**note $id defines the panel dimension (the choice makers)
global idt "ind"
**note: $idt defines the choice situations for each choice maker
global nclasses "4"
global niter "200"
Importantly, EM algorithms have been proved to be very slow and they may con-
verge to local maxima. Hence, we suggest to set a (relative) large number of
iterations and to try with diﬀerent starting values (the routine already computes
random starting values, see below):
*************************
***Get starting values***
*************************
**Partition the sample into $nclasses subsamples:
sort $id $idt $alt
by $id: gen double p=uniform() if _n==_N
by $id: egen double pr=sum(p)
global prop 1/$nclasses
gen double ss=1 if pr<=$prop
forvalues s=2/$nclasses{
replace ss=‘s’ if pr>(‘s’-1)*$prop & pr<=‘s’*$prop
}
drop p pr ta ss
The next step is to estimate a separate CLOGIT for each sub-sample; after each
estimation, use the predict command to get the probability of choosing each alter-
native in each of the $nclasses latent classes; call these vectors of probabilities as
l_, l_2,...,l_C :
117
5. On the role of unobserved preference heterogeneity in discrete choice models of labour supply
forvalues s=1/$nclasses{
clogit $depvar $varlist if ss==‘s’, group($idt)
predict double l_‘s’
}
**Finally, define equal shares for the starting values:
forvalues s=1/$nclasses{
gen double prob‘s’=$prop
}
We now show the steps needed to calculate the posterior probability as in equation
5.27, given the starting values we have just computed.
Firstly, we multiply l_1, l_2,..,l_C by the dummy variable that identifies the
observed choice in each choice situation so as to pick only the probability of the
observed choice.
Secondly, for each choice maker, we multiply the probabilities of the observed
choices in each choice situation. Importantly, notice that this last point is per-
formed through the program gprod , which has to be downloaded from the Internet
(type: "findit gprod" in the Stata command for more information).
forvalues s=1/$nclasses{
qui gen double kbb‘s’=l_‘s’*$depvar
qui recode kbb‘s’ 0=.
by $id: egen double kbbb‘s’=prod(kbb‘s’)
by $id: replace kbbb‘s’=. if _n!=_N
}
The third step is to construct the denominator of eq. 5.27 by computing a weighed
sum of the previous variables (kbbb1, kbbb2, etc.) with weights given by the proba-
bility of class membership (prob1, prob2,..., etc.):
gen double den=prob1*kbbb1
forvalues s=2/$nclasses{
replace den=den+prob‘s’*kbbb‘s’ }
Then we construct the ratio es defined in eq. 5.27 as:
forvalues s=1/$nclasses{
gen double h‘s’=(prob‘s’*kbbb‘s’)/den
qui recode h‘s’ .=0 }
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Finally, we simply rearrange the previous variables (h1, h2, etc.) in order to
create individual-level variables. These are the conditional probabilities C(ηs) as
explained in the text:
forvalues s=1/$nclasses{
by $id: egen double H_‘s’=sum(h‘s’)
}
Before starting the loop that iterates the EM recursion until convergence, we need
to specify a Stata ml command to perform the estimation of the grouped-data
model defined in equation 5.30. and to do this, we use the Stata optimisation tool.
In what follows we use four covariates (the risk factors) to model the probability
of class membership. Finally bear in mind that the vector of parameters for one
latent class is set to zero for identification:
*******************************************************
***compute the ml command for the grouped-data model***
*******************************************************
capture program drop logit_lf
program logit_lf args lnf xb za sa
qui replace ‘lnf’=[H1*ln(1/(1+exp(‘xb’)+exp(‘za’)+exp(‘sa’)))+
H2*ln(exp(‘xb’)/(1+exp(‘xb’)+exp(‘za’)+exp(‘sa’)))+
H3*ln(exp(‘za’)/(1+exp(‘xb’)+exp(‘za’)+exp(‘sa’)))+
H4*ln(exp(‘sa’)/(1+exp(‘xb’)+exp(‘za’)+exp(‘sa’)))] if didep==1
qui replace ‘lnf’=0 if didep==0
end
We now present the loop that repeates the steps above until convergence:
****************
***Start loop***
****************
set more off
local i=1 while ‘i’<= $niter{
quietly{
drop l_*
**Estimate again the C CLOGIT models (one for each class) using the conditional (posterior)
probabilities as weights (as in eq. 5.29). Then recompute the probability of each
alternative (the variables l_1,l_2,..,l_C) using the updated parameters:
set more off
forvalues s=1/$nclasses{
clogit $depvar $varlist [iw=H_‘s’], group($idt)
predict double l_‘s’
}
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**Now call the ml_model defined before and maximise the grouped-data log-likelihood
defined in eq. 5.31. Bear in mind that we introduce four covariates (defined as
f1, f2, f3 and f4):
ml model lf logit_lf (f1 f2 f3 f4) (f1 f2 f3 f4) (f1 f2 f3 f4)
ml max
**update the unconditional probabilities of class membership according to eq. 5.32:
replace prob1=1/(1+exp(_b[eq1:_cons]+_b[eq1:f1]*f1+_b[eq1:f2]*f2+
+_b[eq1:f3]*f3+_b[eq1:f4]*f4)+exp(_b[eq2:_cons]+_b[eq2:f1]*f1
+_b[eq2:f2]*f2+_b[eq2:f3]*f3+_b[eq2:f4]*f4)+exp(_b[eq3:_cons]+
_b[eq3:f1]*f1+_b[eq3:f2]*f2+_b[eq3:f3]*f3+_b[eq3:f4]*f4))
replace prob2=exp(_b[eq1:_cons]+_b[eq1:f1]*f1+_b[eq1:f2]*f2+
_b[eq1:f3]*f3+_b[eq1:f4]*f4)*prob1
replace prob3=exp(_b[eq2:_cons]+_b[eq2:f1]*f1+_b[eq2:f2]*f2+
_b[eq2:f3]*f3+_b[eq2:f4]*f4)*prob1
replace prob4=exp(_b[eq3:_cons]+_b[eq3:f1]*f1+_b[eq3:f2]*f2+
_b[eq3:f3]*f3+_b[eq3:f4]*f4)*prob1
**Now simply update the variables constructed before the loop in order to update
the conditional probabilities used as weights in the previous two sets of maximisations:
capture drop kbbb*
forvalues s=1/$nclasses{
replace kbb‘s’=l_‘s’*$depvar
qui recode kbb‘s’ 0=.
by $id: egen double kbbb‘s’=prod(kbb‘s’)
by $id: replace kbbb‘s’=. if _n!=_N
}
replace den=prob1*kbbb1
forvalues s=2/$nclasses{ replace den=den+prob‘s’*kbbb‘s’
}
***update the weights using the conditional probabilities:
forvalues s=1/$nclasses{
replace h‘s’=(prob‘s’*kbbb‘s’)/den
recode h‘s’ .=0
}
drop H_*
forvalues s=1/$nclasses{
by $id: egen double H_‘s’=sum(h‘s’)
}
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Finally, show the value of the maximised log-likelihood (which is contained in the
variable sumll defined below) and restart the loop:
capture drop sumll
egen sumll=sum(ln(den))
sum sumll global z=r(mean)
local i=‘i’ +1
}
display as green "Iteration " ‘i’ ": log likelihood = " as yellow $z
}
Importantly, since EM algorithms do not compute Standard Errors, these can be
obtained by applying the bootstrap command in Stata.
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Part III.
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6. Final Considerations
The aim of this thesis has been to present a behavioural microsimulation model
for the Italian population. As we has seen in many occasions along the various
chapters, behavioural models are a very useful tool for the analysis of tax-benefit
reforms. Indeed, they represent a more general framework with respect to tradi-
tional static microsimulation models since they allow for individual behavioural
reactions to changes in the economic environment that are induced by a given
public policy.
The dissertation has explored a discrete approach for the estimation of the labour
supply behaviour, which allows incorporating easily in the analysis any kind of
nonconvexities in the budget sets and the non-participation choice. The model we
have proposed includes several innovations with respect to other Italian studies
on labour supply. In particular, we considered simultaneously endogenous child-
care expenditures, unobserved preference heterogeneity, endogenous fixed costs of
working and a systematic way to allow for the endogeneity of wages and errors
in the prediction of wages for non-workers. Importantly, the estimated preference
parameters define a utility function that is coherent with the economic theory,
with an estimated marginal utility of consumption increasing at a decreasing rate
for 99% of households in our sample. Moreover, women preferences for work are
decreasing with the number of dependent children, in particular when the youngest
child is under six years old. Furthermore, preferences for work decrease for either
spouses when they are from southern Italy; increase with own age at a decreasing
rate and are higher for people with high levels of education. The estimated average
labour supply elasticities are in line with the empirical literature ranging between
0.62 - 0.89 for married women and between 0.15 and 0.28 for married men. Average
own elasticities are higher in southern Italy, in particular for households with low
household income, and they are lower for couples with young children.
The application of this model to the evaluation of the last three main reforms
of the Italian personal income tax has shown small changes both in the level of
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inequality and in labour supply, something that was expected given the small
revenue losses produced by these reforms. Hence, attention was focused on the
sign, more than on the magnitude of the behavioural changes.
As for the distributive eﬀects, we found that the two centre-right modules, which
had a total cost of about 13 billion euros, had very small distributive impacts
overall, whilst the subsequent reform by the centre-left government produced a
greater amount of redistribution, since it actually increased the tax burden for
high incomes, with no revenue loss. From a distributive point of view, therefore,
the diﬀerence between the two approaches is clear, although in all cases the changes
in the Gini index have been quite modest.
Concerning the behavioural reactions, the adjustment in the tax structure with
the most significant consequences in terms of labour supply incentives is the exten-
sion of the no-tax area in 2003. This reform produced an increase in female labour
supply for low and middle deciles. As a consequence, the behavioural reactions to
this reform increased real incomes at the bottom of the distribution, therefore fur-
ther reducing the Gini index. Hence, the 2003 module produced both a reduction
in inequality and an increase in labour supply, showing complementarity between
equity and eﬃciency. The 2005 module, on the other hand, increased inequal-
ity but had a (smaller) additional positive impact on labour supply, that slightly
reduced the tendency for inequality to rise. Interestingly, the behavioural contri-
bution that in part counterbalanced the rise in inequality comes from the lower
deciles since the behavioural impact of this reform on the top deciles is absolutely
negligible. The 2007 reform, finally, has had a clear equity eﬀect, further reduc-
ing inequality, but with a reduction in eﬃciency, particularly among low-income
women. This could derive from the expansion of cash transfers, that are decreas-
ing with family income and therefore produce both an income and a substitution
eﬀect on the choice between leisure and consumption, in particular for women in
couples with children. The 2007 reform actually presents the traditional trade-oﬀ
between eﬃciency and equality since it concentrates more public funds towards
low and middle-income households, that have a relatively elastic labour supply.
Importantly, comparing the final structure of the 2007 income tax with that
of the baseline year (2002), several steps forward emerge. Overall work incen-
tives have improved for both women and men in couples, without reducing the
redistributive eﬀect of the personal income tax. From this analysis we derived im-
portant policy recommendations, suggesting the policy makers to reduce marginal
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tax rates on low incomes, providing positive eﬀects in terms of both income dis-
tribution and labour supply, while child benefits should not decrease too rapidly
with the level of family income.
In the last chapter of this essay we focus not on a new application of our model,
but on a practical issue related to this kind of behavioural modelling. Indeed,
we have explored in deep detail the role of unobserved preference heterogeneity
in discrete labour supply models and found that the post-estimation results as
elasticities, inequality index and behavioural responses to tax changes across the
population might diﬀer significantly depending the the way researchers account
for unobserved preference variability. Since standard gradient-based optimisation
algorithm fails to achieve convergence when unobserved heterogeneity in considered
in a more general and comprehensive way, we have developed a new optimisation
method based on an EM algorithm that allows for the nonparametric estimation
of mixing distribution in discrete choice models of labour supply.
Through our algorithm, we compared post-estimation results for diﬀerent specifi-
cations of unobserved heterogeneity and found that results do change significantly
with respect to the base model without unobserved heterogeneity, only when a
large set of parameters is allowed to vary randomly and nonparametrically in the
population. Moreover, we have simulated the distributive and eﬃciency eﬀects
of the introduction of a UK-style working-tax credit into the Italian tax-benefit
system and found that also policy recommendations related to given tax-reforms
may change significantly according to the specification of the unobserved taste
variability in the model.
Our future research will be based on the extension of the behavioural microsim-
ulation model. In particular, the estimation of discrete labour supply models with
endogenous bargaining for married couples will play an important role in the fu-
ture research. What is more, the inclusion of dynamic elements and labour market
rationing are crucial extensions that have to be introduced in order to relax some
of the assumptions that underline our model.
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